**KINÉSIS VS. ENERGEIA:**
A MUCH-READ PASSAGE IN (BUT NOT OF) ARISTOTLE’S *METAPHYSICS*

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*In memoriam Michael Frede*

We are to discuss what is now one of the most famous passages in Aristotle: *Metaphysics* Θ 6, 1048b18–35, on the distinction between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια. The Passage, as I shall capitalize it, has been endlessly analysed by philosophical enthusiasts. It is a particular favourite with those trained in analytic philosophy.¹ But

¹ In part because of the use made of it in modern discussion by Ryle (cited and criticized by Ackrill) and Kenny. Thus Penner: ‘It was Ryle who first showed analytical philosophers the gold mine there was in Aristotle.’ On the other side of the Channel, the view can be rather different: ‘C’est à lui [the Passage] que je m’attacherai, à cause de sa valeur philosophique considérable, et aussi — l’avouera-t-il — par ce souci sportif de venir en aide au passages quelque peu laissés-pour-comptes, et relevés dans les notes et les subordonnés concessives des ouvrages savants . . .’. So wrote Brague (the ‘points of suspension’ are his), twenty-three years after Ackrill’s seminal paper on the Passage. In the sequel Brague cites Ackrill, but none of the articles that poured out in the lively controversy he prompted. I am grateful for Brague’s unanalytic discussion, despite numerous textual disagreements signalled below. The anti-analytic discussion of Dufour, by contrast, is a thicket of confusion. (References: J. L. Ackrill, ‘Aristotle’s Distinction between Energeia and Kinēsion’ ['Distinction'], in R. Bambrough (ed.), *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle [New Essays]* (London and New York, 1965), 121–41 at 123, 125–6 (repr. in J. L. *Aristotle’s Metaphysics,* Cambridge, 2006), 99–114; J. L. Ackrill, ‘Aristotle’s Distinction between Energeia and Kinēsion’ ['Distinction'], in R. Bambrough (ed.), *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle [New Essays]* (London and New York, 1965), 121–41 at 123, 125–6 (repr. in J. L. *Aristotle’s Metaphysics,* Cambridge, 2006), 99–114.)

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few of these enthusiasts have attempted to explain how it fits into the overall programme of \( \Theta \). Ignoring context is usually a fault. But not here, for the good reason that the Passage does not fit into the overall programme of \( \Theta \), was not written for \( \Theta \), and should not be printed in the place we read it today. So I shall argue.

If I am right, the analysts can legitimately keep analysing the Passage on its own, as an isolated fragment of uncertain origin. I will join in myself. For nothing I say here is meant to impugn the philosophical interest and importance of the Passage, or to deny that it is authentic Aristotle. But I will suggest that its focus is rather different from what it is usually taken to be. I will also argue, controversially, that the \( \Theta \) distinct is unique in the corpus and should not be imported into other Aristotelian contexts such as \textit{Nicomachean Ethics 10} or \textit{De anima 2. 5}.

To speak, as I have just done, of ‘the overall programme of \( \Theta \)’ is to take a lot for granted. This is not the place to elaborate a detailed interpretation of \( \Theta \). Let me simply acknowledge that my thinking about \( \Theta \) has been much influenced by Michael Frede’s 1994 paper on potentiality in \textit{Metaphysics \( \Theta \)}.

So far as I am concerned, that is the starting-point for all future discussion of \( \Theta \)’s contribution to the Aristotelian philosophy.

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3 ‘This sentence was written years before Frede’s sudden death at Delphi in August 2007.'
PART I: TEXT

1. To motivate the textual enquiry that follows, I begin with a philosophical complaint. The main business of Θ 6 is to contrive an analogical extension. Θ began by studying the contrast between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in the sphere of change. But Aristotle made it clear from the outset that for his current project, which is to explain potential and actual being, change is not the most useful sphere to consider (Θ 1, 1045a27–1046a4). We begin there in order to arrive somewhere else, where the contrast is between δύναμις as ἄλη and ἐνέργεια as οὐσία. That transition is the task of Θ 6, as Aristotle explains both at the start of the chapter (Θ 6, 1048b25–30) and when the extension has been completed (1048b6–9). I use C to mark cases of change, S for the cases of substantial being that Aristotle wants to reach:

Since we have discussed the kind of potentiality which is spoken of in connection with change, let us determine what, and what sort of thing, actuality is. In the course of our analysis it will become clear, with regard to the potential, that besides ascribing potentiality to that whose nature it is to change something else or to be changed by something else, either without qualification or in a certain manner, we also use the term in another sense, which is what we have been after in discussing these previous senses.

Actuality [ἐνέργεια] is the thing being present [ὑπάρχειν], but not in the way we speak of when we say it is potentially present; (S) we say that potentially, for instance, a Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line in the whole, because it might be separated out, and (C) even someone who is not exercising knowledge [μὴ θεωροῦντα] we call knowledgeable [ἐπιστήµονα] if they are capable of exercising knowledge. The other case [sc. when they are exercising it] is (knowledge) in actuality.

Our meaning can be seen by induction from particular cases. We should not seek to capture everything in a definition, but some things we should comprehend [παράγοντος] by analogy. Thus as (C) that which is building is to that which is capable of building, so is the waking to the sleeping, and that which sees (something)⁵ to a sighted thing with its eyes shut, and (S) that

⁵ Throughout this paper I am faced with translation difficulties arising from the fact that the morphology of ancient Greek verbs does not distinguish, as English morphology does, between the continuous and the non-continuous present. Since I am translating, I write whichever form strikes me as the most natural way, in the given context, to put Aristotle’s verbs into English. Consequently, I feel no obligation to follow Ross and other English translators who write ‘is seeing’ here to match the previous ‘is building’. I write ‘sees’, with the accusative ‘something’
which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought to the unwrought. Let actuality [ἐνέργεια] be distinguished as one part of this antithesis, the potential [τὸ δυνατόν] as the other. Not everything is said to be in actuality [ἐνέργεια] in the same sense, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is Γ in Δ or to Δ; for (C) some are related as change [κίνησις] to capacity [δύναμις], while (S) others are related as substance to some matter. (Θ 6, 1048b25–26)\(^\text{a}\)

Notice that in this text building is listed, alongside exercising knowledge, being awake, and seeing, as an example of ἐνέργεια, while all four are classed as κίνησις in relation to δύναμις. In the Passage, by contrast, building is not ἐνέργεια, but κίνησις (1048b29–31), while seeing is not κίνησις, but ἐνέργεια (1048b23, 33–4).

No problem yet. The Passage introduces a new distinction. Some actions (πράξεις) have an external goal, some do not, because the goal is the action itself. Building aims at the production of a house, which will last for years to come. Seeing, by contrast, does not aim at a further product. Its goal is internal to itself, to see what is there to be seen.\(^\text{7}\) The new distinction divides the previous list of C-type ἐνέργεια into two groups: those like seeing which are ἐνέργειαι in the new, more tightly defined sense that they aim at nothing beyond themselves, and those like building which aim at a further product.

The latter become κωόρεις in a sense of the word more specific than inserted to stop ‘sees’ being equivalent to ‘has sight’. The fact is that ‘is seeing’ is relatively rare in English, for reasons not unconnected with the philosophical content of the Passage. It is in part because Greek morphology lacks an equivalent to our distinction between two forms of the present that Aristotle has a phenomenon to analyse. Read on.

\(^{a}\) My translation here borrows freely from Ross–Barnes and Irwin–Fine, but I decline to follow them in translating ἀφωριστὴν (1048b3) as if it referred to the definition Aristotle has just said we should not seek. For reasons given by the ‘Londinenses’ I agree with Jaeger’s decision to read ἦν with EJ at 1048b37, rather than ἦν’s accusative, and θάτερον μόριον with Alexander at 1048b5–6 rather than the manuscripts’ datives, but I reject Jaeger’s supplement (§) (from Α’) at 1048b5. (Reference: W. Jaeger (ed.), Aristotelis Metaphysica, recognovit breviisque adnotatione critica instruxit ['Jaeger'] (Oxford, 1957); ‘Londinenses’, Notes on Eta and Theta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics [Notes], recorded by Myles Burnyeat and others (Oxford, 1984), 125–6; W. D. Ross and J. Barnes, Metaphysics, in J. Barnes (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. ii ['Ross–Barnes'] (Princeton, 1984).)

\(^{7}\) This should not mean that seeing is not useful to us, or that it cannot be valued as a means as well as an end. That would be inconsistent with e.g. Metaph. A 1, 98b24–6, and NE 1. 6, 1096b16–19 (cf. 3. 10, 1118a22–3). Protrepticus B70 D says: ‘One would choose to have sight even if nothing other than sight itself were to result from it.’ The means–end relation extends further than the relation of action to product.
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at 1048b8, where it covered seeing and the exercise of knowledge as well as building.

But now move on to Θ 8, 1050bc2–b2:

And while in some cases the exercise (χρήσις) is the ultimate thing (e.g. in sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no further product besides this results from sight), but from some things a product follows (e.g. from the art of building there results a house over and above the art of building), yet none the less in the former type of case the exercise is the end (τέλος), and in the latter more of an end than the potentiality (δύναμις) is. This is because the act of building is in what is being built, and it comes to be, and is, simultaneously with the house.

Where, then, what comes to be is something apart from the exercise, the actuality (ἐνέργεια) is in the object being produced, e.g. the actuality of building is in what is being built and that of weaving in what is being woven, and similarly in other cases, and in general the change (κίνησις) is in what is being changed; though there is no further product apart from the actuality (ἐνέργεια), the actuality is in the subjects themselves, e.g. the seeing is in the one who sees and the theorizing (θεωρεῖν) in the one who theorizes, and life is in the soul (which is why happiness is too; for it is a certain sort of life). (1050bc2–b2, trans. after Ross–Barnes)

This text develops a distinction like that drawn in the Passage between seeing, which is its own end, and building, which aims at a further product, but the distinction is presented as a distinction between two kinds of ἐνέργεια. Not as a distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις. In Θ 8 ἐνέργεια contrasts with δύναμις, not with κίνησις.

Similarly, ἐνέργεια contrasted with δύναμις before the Passage, when Θ 1 opened the enquiry by announcing that the first topic to consider would be potentiality and actuality (δύναμις and ἐνέργεια) in the sphere of change (κίνησις), where the relevant potentialities are (first and primarily) the capacity to bring about change (μεταβολὴ) in another or in oneself quia other, and (second and derivatively) the correlative capacity to undergo change by the agency of another or oneself quia other (1045b35–1046a13). The corresponding actuality (ἐνέργεια) is the change (μεταβολὴ or κίνησις) taking place.

* ‘Change’ here includes substantial change.
* μεταβολὴ is the word used in Θ 1, but κίνησις takes over from Θ 2, 1046a17.
(As Physics 3. 1–3 explains, the two potentialities issue in a single actuality, which is active change when viewed from the side of the agent, a passive undergoing when viewed from the side of the patient.) Editors who print the Passage in its usual place owe us an account of why, when he makes his all-important distinction, Aristotle does not alert us to the difference between his present and his previous use of ἐνέργεια. In his previous use ἐνέργεια does not contrast with κίνησις, but includes it. Indeed, Θ 3, 1047'30–2, tells us that, historically, κίνησις is the primary case of ἐνέργεια, the case from which the term ἐνέργεια was extended to cover the actuality of being as well as the actuality of change.

The text quoted from Θ 8 is another challenge for editors to explain. Why, having introduced the distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις, should Aristotle proceed to ignore it? Not only Θ 8, but all the rest of Θ is written without the slightest regard for the terminological innovation which is the main burden of the Passage.

Time for philology.

2. Let me start with three different presentations of the manuscript evidence for the Passage:

(a) Christ (1885) 18 ἐπεί–35 κίνησις om E Alex. . . . 28 τοῦτω–35 κίνησιν linea perducta delenda significat Α³.

(b) Ross (1924) 18 ἐπεί–35 κίνησις Α⁴, codd. plerique, Philop., cod. F Alexandri: om EJ¹, codd. ceteri Alexandri . . . 28 τοῦτω–35 κίνησιν expunxit Α⁴.

(c) Jaeger (1957) 18 ἐπεί–35 κίνησις Α⁵ et rec. plerique: om. II Al (add. unus Alexandri cod. F); additamentum ut vid. ab ipso Ar. ortum (cf. 35 λέγω), oratio est admodum dura et obscura et in libris corrupta; verba 35 τὸ μὲν οὖν . . . 36 ἔστω recapitulatio sunt, sed corum quae hoc additamentum praeceudent (!) . . . 28 τοῦτω–35 κίνησιν delenda notat Α⁵.

The three versions send rather different signals to the reader.

It is well known that the Metaphysics is an open tradition, going back to two different ancient editions of the text. It survives in two independent branches, which in Harlfinger’s ground-breaking study are dubbed α and β.11 Plate 1 gives the overall picture. You can see, very clearly, the double pattern of transmission.

The primary manuscripts for ζ are E (tenth century) and J (ninth century); Jaeger’s II denotes their consensus. For ζ the primary manuscript is A\textsuperscript{b}, written in the twelfth century, although from A 7, 1074\textsuperscript{1}, to the end a fourteenth-century hand takes over and follows the EJ tradition. The Passage is found in A\textsuperscript{b}, not in EJ. Should the apparatus criticus start from the absence, as Christ does (J was unknown to him),\textsuperscript{13} or, with Ross and Jaeger, from the presence?

I believe it is the absence of the Passage from one entire branch that should be underlined. Ross gives a table of the main lacunae (his word) in E, of which the Passage is by far the longest. He estimates that around 750 letters are missing (the precise number depends on how one emends a badly damaged text). The next largest omission is only 61 letters.\textsuperscript{13} (The largest lacuna in A\textsuperscript{b}, which editors say is highly lacunose by comparison with EJ, is 169 letters.)\textsuperscript{14} Such an exceptionally large lacuna is hard to explain by mechanical damage or the usual types of scribal error. The Passage appears to be a coherent textual unit, with beginning, middle, and end, so one possibility is a learned excision from the ζ branch; in due course we will be looking at evidence of an attempted excision in A\textsuperscript{b}. But a more economical suggestion is that A\textsuperscript{b} preserves what Jaeger calls an ‘additamentum’ of considerable length.

Jaeger had a keen nose for detecting additions made by Aristotle himself when revising or updating a treatise. In his OCT\textsuperscript{12} of the Metaphysics he uses double square brackets to mark (what he judges to be) additions of this nature, additions by Aristotle himself. Since he prints the Passage within double square brackets, we must suppose that by ‘additamentum’ he means an addition by Aristotle himself, which was subsequently lost or excised from the

ancient editions (Auszgaben) in his very first paragraph, with acknowledgement to W. Christ, Aristotelis Metaphysica, recognovit, nova editio corrector ['Christ'] (Leipzig, 1805 [1st edn. 1886]), and Jaeger. The section on ‘The Text of the Metaphysics’ in Ross, vol. i, pp. clx–clxvi, contains further useful information.

\textsuperscript{12} Gerke was the first announcement of the importance of J, Ross the first edition to use it for constituting the text. Both Bekker and Schwegler side with Christ in highlighting the absence of the Passage from the ζ tradition as they knew it from E. (References: I. Bekker, Aristoteles Graece, edidit Academia Regia Borussica ['Bekker'] (2 vols.; Berlin, 1871); A. Gercke, Aristoteleum, Wiener Studien, 14 (1892), 146–8; A. Schwegler, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Grundtext, Übersetzung und Commentar nebst erläuternden Abhandlungen ['Schwegler'] (4 vols.; Tübingen, 1847–8; repr. Frankfurt a.M., 1969.).

\textsuperscript{13} Ross, vol. i, p. clx.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. clx.
EJ tradition.13 But Jaeger’s expression ‘additamentum ut vid. ab Ar. ipso ortum’ could equally well suggest that the addition stems from someone other than Aristotle, reproducing words written by Aristotle for some other context. That is the line I shall eventually pursue.

For the moment, however, let me stress that ‘additamentum’ is the mot juste, for the reason Jaeger gives when in his apparatus he says of lines 1048b35–6, ‘recapitulatio sunt, sed eorum, quae hoc additamentum praecedunt (!)’. Θ 6 began by proposing to determine ‘what, and what sort of thing, actuality is’ (1048b26–7: τι τέ έστιν ή ἐνέργεια καὶ τοιοῦ τι). It ends, echoing these very words, by saying that the job is now done: ‘What, and what sort of thing, “in actuality” is may be taken as explained by these and similar considerations’ (1048b35–6: το μὲν οὖν ἐνέργεια τι τέ έστι καὶ τοιοῦ, έκ τούτων καὶ τοιούτων δήλων ήμῶν έστω). The main body of Θ 6 wants to know what it is for something to be in actuality (note the dative ἐνέργεια at 1048b35, b6, 10–11, 15), i.e. to be something actually, as contrasted with what it is for something to be in potentiality (δύναμει, 1048b32, b10, 14, 16), i.e. to be something potentially. The Passage is about what it is to be an actuality (ἐνέργεια in the nominative), as opposed to a mere change (κάσησις): an entirely different question. As Jaeger remarked, the last sentence of Θ 6 ignores this second question and links back to the topic proposed at the beginning of the chapter; note EJ’s dative ἐνέργεια again at 1048b35.14 What is more, έκ τούτων in the last sentence (1048b36) can hardly refer to the Passage immediately preceding, because that is on the second question, not the first.15

13 See his explanation of the brackets at p. xvii. Jaeger’s hypothesis about the origin of the Passage was anticipated by A. Smeets, Act en potentie in de Metaphysica van Aristoteles: historisch-philologisch onderzoek van boek IX en boek V der Metaphysica, avec un résumé en français [‘Smeets’] (Leuven, 1952), 56–7.
14 Α1 has ἐνέργεια here: unsatisfactory, since the verb has not featured in the chapter so far, but it too links better with the opening question than with the narrower question of the Passage.
15 Christ, Ross Tr. (but not his edition), and Tricot print the last sentence of Θ 6 as the first of Θ 7. The chapter divisions have no ancient authority, of course (they derive from Bessarion’s Latin translation, which did not have the Passage, and first appear with a Greek text in Michael Isingrin’s 1550 reissue of Erasmus’ edition), but for that very reason ancient readers would expect έκ τούτων to refer to what immediately precedes. The move cures nothing. (References: Bessarion: see Bibliography (1), i.e. Argyropoulos; D. Erasmus, Aristotelis... opera... omnia (Basel, 1531, 1539, 1550); W. D. Ross, Metaphysica [‘Ross Tr.’] (The Works of Aristotle Translated into English: (1) under the Editorship of J. A. Smith and
So far, then, I agree with Jaeger that the Passage is an addition which interrupts the main argument of Θ 6. And I am inclined to agree also that the Passage is authentic Aristotle, both in style—Jaeger cites the first-person verb λέγω (1ο4β35), which is indeed a feature of Aristotle’s prose—and in thought. Who else would have such thoughts? More on that later.

Let me also make it clear that I do not take the fact that the Passage interrupts the argument of Θ 6 as a reason for doubting that the addition was made by Aristotle. Such awkwardness is fairly common in other places where Jaeger and others find reason to diagnose additions from Aristotle’s own hand. My argument for someone else’s intervention will come later, on different grounds.

Meanwhile, a brief word about the infinite in 1ο4β9–17. This section is a supplement to what precedes. It applies the main question of the chapter, ‘What is it to be in actuality?’, to a case that does not fall under either of the headings (C) as change [κίνησις] to capacity [δύναµις]’ or (S) as substance to some matter. The infinite has a different way (ἄλλως) of being in potentiality and actuality. It does not have the potentiality to be actual as an infinite magnitude existing on its own (χωριστῶν). Rather, it has the potentiality to be actual for knowledge (1ο4β15: γνώσει). This is difficult—difficult both to translate and to interpret.

First, the problem of translation: how much to supply with γνώσει from the preceding clause? Ross Tr. supplies the minimum: ‘It exists potentially only for knowledge’. Barnes restored Ross Tr.: ‘its separateness is only in knowledge’. (Similarly Furth.) My para-


16 465 hits in the TLG, including one just a couple of pages back at Θ 5, 1ο4β10–11.
19 Two cases which I endorse are (i) the hypothesis of Ross and others that Metaph. Z 7–9 began as a separate essay which Aristotle later incorporated into its present context (I discuss the resulting awkwardnesses in Burneyt, Map, 29–38), and (ii) the Solmsen–Barnes hypothesis that Aristotle added two sections of syllogistic analysis to the otherwise topic-based treatment of argument in his Rhetoric (this too creates awkwardness, which I discuss in M. F. Burneyt, ‘Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion’, in D. J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), Aristotle’s Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays (Proceedings of the XIIth Symposium Aristotelicium; Princeton, 1994), 3–35 at 35–8.
phrase of the received text, ‘it has the potentiality to be actual for knowledge’, is motivated by 1048b10–11, which leads us to expect an account covering both what it is for the infinite to be in potentiality and what is it for it to be in actuality.

But none of these versions is easy to understand. Certainly, we know that, however many divisions are made, more are possible. But how can that knowledge of ours ensure the potential being of the infinite? Or its separateness? Or its actuality? The reality of the infinite ought to be prior to knowledge, not posterior. And how to square this text with Phys. 3. 6, 207'25–6 (cf. 1. 6, 189'12–13; Post. An. 1. 22, 82b8–31), where Aristotle claims that the infinite qua infinite is unknowable? I offer a simple emendation to remove the difficulty.

At Metaph. Z 13, 1038b28, there is much to be said for Lord’s emendation of γενέσει to γνώσει to bring the text into line with what was said about the priority of substance in Z 1, 1028a32–3. The converse emendation here (γνώσει→γενέσει) would bring Θ 6 into line with Phys. 3. 6, 206'21–5, where the infinite is said to be in actuality in the same way as a day or a contest, τῷ ἄει ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γένεσθαι. As one hour or one race succeeds another, a magnitude’s potential for continuous division is actualized by successive cuts, one after another. The infinite has a potentiality to be actual not as a separate entity but γενέσει, in a process which may go on and on without limit.

4. Now let me turn to Ross and his account of the positive testimony in favour of the Passage in the direct and indirect traditions. His commentary ad loc. is even more gung-ho than his apparatus:

This passage occurs in most of the manuscripts (including Λ), and a paraphrase of it occurs in a good manuscript of Alexander (F). It is omitted by EJTI and Bessarion, and is very corrupt in the other manuscripts. But it contains sound Aristotelian doctrine and terminology, and is quite appro-

20 Such is the explanation offered by the ‘Londinenses’, 127, and (if I understand him) Ross ad loc. H. Bonitz, Aristotelis Metaphysica, recognovit et enarravit [’Bonitz’] (2 vols.; Bonn, 1848–9), is surprised at the almost frivolous way (’mira levisitas’) Aristotle tackles the question of how the infinite is in potentiality and actuality.

21 In their recent edition, Aristoteles: Metaphysik Z, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (Munich 1988), M. Frede and G. Patzig print γνώσει and give convincing reasons in their note ad loc.

22 This proposal has already been accepted by S. Makin, Aristotle: Metaphysics, Book Θ, translated with an introduction and commentary [’Makin’] (Oxford, 2006), ad loc.
Clariﬁcations: T, a fourteenth-century manuscript, is one of just two ‘codices recentiores’ listed among Ross’s sigla.14 Γ is the Latin translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics by William of Moerbeke (c. 1265–72), which was based on J and another manuscript from the z tradition.13 A version of Cardinal Bessarion’s Latin translation of c.1452 may be found in volume iii of the Berlin Academy’s classic edition of the works of Aristotle.15 None of these antedates A. That said by way of clarriﬁcation, I take up Ross’s several points in order:

(i) ‘This passage occurs in most of the manuscripts (including A’). Understandable at the time it was written, long before Harlingfer’s stemma gave us a clear picture of how the recentiores relate to the primary manuscripts and to each other. This stemma was based on a collation of four stretches of text (book A 980b21–982a3, all of a, K 1059b18–1106a20, N 1092b9–1093b28), followed by a collation of H 1045b1–Θ 1045b36 for some fourteen manuscripts which the first collation had revealed to be wholly or partly independent of each other. In none of this was the Passage included. But Christian Brockmann kindly looked on my behalf at the photographic collection in the Aristotelis-Archiv in Berlin and discovered that the important manuscripts containing the Passage are all ones which Harlingfer had independently shown to belong to the $\beta$ tradition or to have been contaminated by it. Thus the Passage conﬁrms the correctness of Harlingfer’s stemma.

In a letter dated 26 June 1995 Brockmann writes:

Nach Prüfung der wichtigsten Handschriften läßt sich die Frage ‘Wie ist der Passus Met. θ 6, 1048b 18–35, überliefert?’ zunächst einmal klar

13 Ross, ii. 253.
14 For its afﬁliations (pretty mixed), see Harlingfer.
15 G. Vuillemin-Diém, Metaphysica Lib. I–XIV, recensio et translatio Guillelmi de Moerbec (Aristoteles Latinus, XXV 3.1–2; Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1993), 165–99. G. Vuillemin-Diém, Metaphysica Lib. I–X, XII–XIV, Translatio Anonyma sive ‘Media’ (Aristoteles Latinus, XXV.2; Leiden, 1975), lxii–lxvii, suggests that the ‘Translatio Anonyma sive ‘Media’, dating from before the start of the 13th cent., is based on a manuscript with afﬁliates to both the z and the $\beta$ traditions; nevertheless, the Passage is missing there too.
16 The Latin version of the Passage at 513b17–34 is in square brackets, because it is not the work of Bessarion but an addition to cater for Bekker’s Greek text in volume ii of the Berlin edition. No name is attached to the translation, which differs markedly from Strozza’s version (n. 44 below).
beantworten und hier bestätigt sich eindeutig das Stemma von Dieter Harlfinger.

Der Passus fehlt im Überlieferungszweig α: fehlt in Vind. phil. 100 (J), Par. 1853 (E), Esc. Y 3. 18 (E'), Vat. 255 (V), Laur. 87, 18 (B'). In Vat. 255 (V) ist der Text von einem zweiten Schreiber, einem Korrektor, am Ende der *Metaphysik* ergänzt worden, wobei er an der Stelle, wo der Text fehlt, einen Hinweis auf die Ergänzung eingetragen hat: ζήτει τὸ τοιοῦτον [...] ἐν τῷ τελεί τοῦ βιβλίου (wahrscheinlich σχῆμα). 27

Der Passus ist vorhanden im Zweig β: vorhanden in Laur. 87, 12 (A'), Amb. F 113 sup. (M), Taur. B VII 23 (C), Marc. 205 (D'). Der Text ist außerdem vorhanden in Par. 1850 (D) und Oxon. N.C. 230 (O'). Wenn man in Harlfingers Stemma schaut, erklärt sich dieser Befund: Vermittler ist der Marc. 205 (D''), der auf A' zurückgeht. Diese Handschriften sind also in diesem Punkt nicht unabhängig von A'. 28 Im Marc. 205 (D'') gibt es zur Stelle einen Hinweis von jüngerer Hand, daß dieser Passus sich in manchen Büchern nicht finde, und dass es mit dem Text τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐνεργεία τί ἔστι bei dem Zeichen weitergehe.

Jaeger's annotation 'A' et recc. plerique' was wiser than Ross's bold 'codd. plerique', though 'plerique' is false in either case.

What is most interesting about these findings is that the Passage occurs in M (fourteenth century) and C (fifteenth century), the two recentiores which Harlfinger singled out as worthy of attention from future editors of the *Metaphysics*, because they witness to the β tradition independently of A'. 29 We may thus conclude that the Passage was already in the β branch before A', in some common ancestor it shared with M and C. Brockmann's collation of the Passage in M and C is printed for the record as Appendix 1 below.

The next step was taken during my time as Fellow of the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin in 2004/5, when over a number of visits to the Aristoteles-Archiv Brockmann kindly took me through a survey of the remaining recentiores. The results, which confirm and strengthen the findings of his original letter, are best seen in Plate 1, where my red circle marks a manuscript we found to contain

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27 The σχῆμα is a plain circle, which duly reappears right at the end of the manuscript, where the Passage is written out.

28 In a later letter Brockmann reported that the Passage is also present in the 15th-cent. Taur. C 12. 5 (Z), as was to be expected given that Harlfinger's stemma places it between D and O'.

the Passage, my blue square a manuscript which does not include book Θ. I put a dotted red circle around Marc. 211 (E^6) to indicate that the Passage is absent from the main text but a fourteenth-century hand has written it in the margin. The dotted red circle around Vat. 255 (V^6) also indicates a corrector’s activity, as explained in Brockmann’s letter. The majority of the manuscripts have no mark from me because they transmit Θ without the Passage.

Before continuing my response to Ross, let me note that the investigation summarized in Plate 1 amounts to a complete collation of the relevant manuscripts for a passage of the *Metaphysics* which did not figure in Harlfinger’s original project. The results of this independent research uniformly confirm his stemma. All the more reason for me to express my deep gratitude to Christian Brockmann for help over many hours staring at microfilm in the Aristoteles-Archiv: time and again his trained eyes understood what mine could only see.

(ii) ‘and a paraphrase of it occurs in a good manuscript of Alexander (F).’ True, but the situation is more complicated than Ross reveals. In Hayduck’s Berlin Academy edition of Alexander, which Ross is using, the siglum F denotes a copy of the so-called Alexander commentary written in the margins of one of the recentiores just mentioned, Ambr. F 113 sup. (M). I say ‘so-called’ because by the time the commentary gets to Θ—in fact from book E onwards—we are no longer reading Alexander of Aphrodisias (second century AD), but a Pseudo-Alexander who can safely be identified as Michael of Ephesus, who wrote early in the twelfth century. Now another good text of the Alexander commentary, Hayduck’s L, is found in the margins of A^5 itself (thus L = A^5 as F = M)—and here the paraphrase is missing. Furthermore, F’s paraphrase begins by

\[ \text{On this hand, which made extensive corrections in E^5 and may have affiliations with C, see Harlfinger, 14.} \]

\[ \text{The identity of Pseudo-Alexander with Michael, proposed by S. Ebbesen,} \]

saying τούτο τὸ κεφάλαιον ἐν πολλοῖς λέιτες: ‘this chapter is missing in many copies’. Hayduck prints the feeble paraphrase that follows in a footnote, not in his main text, which implies that in his judgement (to be confirmed below) its author is not even Pseudo-Alexander. It is someone else’s addition to the commentary, a supplement designed to make up for the fact that Pseudo-Alexander himself said nothing about the Passage, because he did not know of its existence. Hence the absence of the paraphrase in L, despite the presence of the Passage in A where L is written. The paraphrase is an anxious response to the presence of the Passage in M, not independent evidence in favour of reading it there.

(iii) ‘But it [the Passage] contains sound Aristotelian doctrine and terminology’. Where exactly does Ross find his proof of soundness? The issue is important enough to claim our attention later. I will argue that Ross is right about the doctrine (witness Θ 8 as just quoted, or NE 1. 1), but that the terminology is unique to the Passage. Even NE 10. 3–5, often cited as parallel, will not serve.

(iv) ‘and is quite appropriate to its context’. Not really, as Jaeger helped us see. Readers from the USA please note that ‘quite’ here does not mean ‘very’. That would be an absurd claim.

(v) ‘and there is no apparent motive for its introduction’. I agree. The motive remains to be discovered.

One further item, from Ross’s apparatus: ‘Philop.’ An unwary reader could easily be reassured by this: at least the Passage was known to Philoponus in the sixth century AD. Not at all. The commentary in question was wrongly ascribed to Philoponus, as is proved by its containing references to Michael of Ephesus.32

Two further facts about Pseudo-Philoponus are relevant here. The first is that it was he who composed the paraphrase added in F. The Greek text of his commentary remains unpublished; for a long time it was known only through a sixteenth-century Latin translation by Francesco Patrizzi (=Frane Petrić, the founding father of Croatian philosophy).33 But Michael Frede showed me pho-

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32 See Ebbesen, Commentators, appendix 8: ‘Ps.-Philoponus, in Metaphysicam’.
33 Now reprinted with an introduction by Lohr. Already Bonitz in his 1847 edition of the Alexander commentary was led by the Latin to suspect that Pseudo-Philoponus might be the author of the paraphrase, which Bonitz knew in the incomplete citation of Brandis’s collected scholia. [References: Alexander of Aphrodiasia, In Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria, ed. H. Bonitz (Berlin, 1847), 531; C. A. Brandis (ed.), Scholia in Aristotelem, collegit Christianus Augustus Brandis, edidit
tographs of the two known complete Greek manuscripts of this commentary: the paraphrase occurs on fos. 105v–106 of cod. Vat. Urb. gr. 49 (fourteenth century) and fo. 150v of cod. Vind. gr. Phil. 189 (sixteenth century).\(^3\) In both the paraphrase is plain to see.

The second relevant fact is that it has recently been revealed that what Ross called ‘a good MS of Alexander (F)’ is not all by Alexander and Pseudo-Alexander. From book K onwards it is Pseudo-Philoponus, and the manuscript ascribes this portion of the commentary to George Pachymeres (1242–c.1310).\(^3\) There can be little doubt that the scribe who wrote F in Ambr. F 113 sup. (M) had access in the Bibliotheca Ambrosiana to the commentary of Pseudo-Philoponus, i.e. Pachymeres, who is a century later than A\(^b\). For the end of the Pseudo-Philoponus commentary is also found at fos. 27v–30v of Ambr. I 117 inf. (sixteenth century).\(^3\) When the scribe noticed that Pseudo-Alexander had nothing to say about the Passage, he compensated by borrowing the paraphrase from a nearby copy of Pseudo-Philoponus.

5. Finally, the curious and highly unusual line drawn through the latter part of the Passage in A\(^b\), most clearly described by Christ: ‘28 τούτων–35 κύριαν linea perducta delenda significat A\(^b\)’. Plate 2 shows a thin vertical line starting just above the middle of τούτων, near the centre of the first line of fo. 36v, which then proceeds downwards to the fourteenth line of writing. The last words of the fourteenth line are ἐκείνην δὲ κύριαν. The line stops under the ε


\(^3\) These two manuscripts are, respectively, nos. 1999 and 2214 in A. Wartelle, *Inventaire des manuscrits grecs d’Aristote et de ses commentateurs: contribuition à l’histoire du texte d’Aristote* ['Wartelle'] (Paris, 1965).


\(^3\) See Wartelle no. 1022 with annotation.
of ἐκείνης, where it meets the circumflex accent over ἐνεργεία (A<sup>b</sup>’s variant for ἐνεργεία at 1048<sup>35</sup>)—again roughly in the centre of the line of writing. This the editors interpret as marking for deletion all of 1048<sup>28–34</sup> plus the first four words of 35.

Now the reddish-brown ink used for the line is the same colour as the ink used for L, the version of the Alexander commentary written in the margin of A<sup>b</sup>. The Aristotelian text in A<sup>b</sup> is also reddish-brown but noticeably darker, often almost black. This is clear evidence that the line was drawn by the scribe who wrote L, not by some later corrector. There was no such line in the ἀντίγραφον, otherwise it would have been copied (if copied at all) in the darker ink of the main text. This is confirmed by the fact that there is no such line in either M or C.<sup>18</sup>

But the scribe who wrote the bulk of L, including the part under discussion, also wrote the corresponding part of the main text of A<sup>b</sup> up to Α 7, 1073<sup>a</sup>.<sup>19</sup> The two inks flow from two pens (the letters in the text are thicker than those in the margin) held in turn by a single hand.<sup>20</sup> As one page succeeds another, you see each ink oscillating independently between darker and lighter, as each pen is dipped into the ink or its ink bottle is refilled. But what matters here is that the Passage is a different tint from the surrounding commentary and the line of deletion. This suggests that the scribe would first write a chunk of Aristotle, leaving space for the commentary above, below and alongside the main text, and only later go back to enter the relevant portion of commentary. One can almost see it happening.

Across the top of fo. 361<sup>r</sup>, above the first line of the main text (1048<sup>18</sup>, where the vertical line begins), run two lines of the commentary (581. 16–19 in Hayduck’s edition: καί εἰπὼν τὸ μὲν οὗν ἐνεργεία τί ἐστὶ καὶ ποίον . . . νῦν λέγει, ὅτι πότε δυνάμει), which belong to the transition that Pseudo-Alexander is now making from Θ 6 to Θ 7. He has finished with Θ 6. Not so the main text below,

<sup>17</sup> n. 16 above.

<sup>18</sup> Which puts paid to the fantastic suggestion of P. Gohlke, Übersetzung der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, 2nd edn. (Paderborn, 1951), 445 n. 77, that the line was drawn by Aristotle, once he had committed himself to the Physics 3 doctrine that κάρπος is after all a kind of ἐνεργεία, and faithfully transmitted in the A<sup>b</sup> tradition.

<sup>19</sup> Harlingrter, 32 with n. 62, hesitates over whether to assign responsibility for Metaph. Α–Α 7 to one scribe or two contemporary ones. That is irrelevant here since, if they are two, the change-over comes at fo. 456<sup>r</sup>, nearly a hundred pages after Θ 6.

<sup>20</sup> The same situation in M: both text and commentary are one and the same hand throughout.
in which Θ 7 only starts near the bottom of the page at the seventeenth of nineteen lines of writing, because the Passage is still in full flow. Whether or not the scribe noticed this extra material earlier, he cannot help noticing it now. And that puts him in exactly the situation that led to the paraphrase from Pseudo-Philoponus being added to F in the margin of M. What to do about a large chunk of Aristotelian text to which nothing in the commentary corresponds? The same situation but a different response. Instead of adding to the commentary, the scribe of L pauses to subtract some of the Aristotelian text. At least, that is what he does if editors are right to interpret the line as a mark of deletion.

I shall assume that they are right, because the result of deleting exactly the words τοῦτων . . . κίνησιν would be to restore the balance between the main text and the accompanying commentary. The last sentence of Θ 6 would begin on the first line of the main text, just below the last line of the upper portion of commentary where ἄτι πότε δυνάμει starts elucidating Θ 7. Delete the first part of the Passage as well and the commentary would run a full page ahead of the Aristotelian text. Keeping text and commentary in step with each other is something any scribe might care about, but this one more than most—because he got it so disastrously wrong before.

All through the first five books of the Metaphysics Α is full of blank white spaces. Evidently, the scribe began what was meant to be an edition de luxe by copying out the whole of books Α–Δ on their own, often only a few lines per page, leaving much more space than would turn out to be needed for the Alexander commentary in the margin. Perhaps he did not have the Alexander commentary to hand and assumed it would be more expansive than it is. When he did get hold of the commentary, all he could do was trail it down the margin in lines of irregular length, at times writing as few as two or three words in a space that could take many more. The effect is pretty, like a cascade of pink water each side of the page, but wasteful of expensive parchment. By contrast, from book Ε onwards the layout is efficiency itself. The white margin separating commentary and text can stay reasonably constant, because text and commentary keep more or less in step with each other—until we reach the Passage on fo. 361'. At which point the scribe signals the need to take action.

41 In that case Harlfinger, 32, would not be right to suggest that the ἄντίγραφον of Α included both main text and commentary.
The action is twofold. First, the deletion of exactly the words τοῦτον . . . κίνησιν, no more. Second, adjusting the balance of text and commentary in the following pages in order to restore correspondence between the two. This takes a while. When chapter 8 begins on fo. 363r the main text (a smaller chunk than usual) is still running some 10 cm. ahead of the commentary. But by the beginning of chapter 9 on fo. 371r exact parity has been achieved, allowing Θ to end as neatly as it began. Iota then begins a new page of its own.

This is a thoroughly ‘physical’ explanation of the line of deletion.42 There is simply no need to wonder why the scribe did not turn back a page to delete the earlier part of the Passage (1048b18–27) as well. He is not objecting to the content, but dismayed to find his text and commentary out of sync again.

6. To sum up: the Passage is well attested in branch 3, not at all in z. Harlunger’s investigations, which postdate the editions of Ross and Jaeger, underline the difficulties that both confronted. The Passage is better confirmed than before in 3, eliminated entirely from z. What is an editor to do?

We are so familiar with the Passage that most of us find it hard to imagine a Metaphysics which simply leaves it out. But there have been such versions. As already noted (Section 4 above), it was not in Cardinal Bessarion’s Latin translation (c.1452), done from Hr,43 which Plate 1 shows as lacking the Passage. It was neither in the Latin translation/paraphrase of the first twelve books of the Metaphysics by Argyropoulos (c.1415–87) nor among the lemmata Latinized by Sepúlveda for his translation of the Alexander commentary (1527). Tracking back further, none of the medieval Latin translations includes the Passage. In particular, its absence from the Moerbeke translation used by Aquinas ensured that we have no comment on its subtleties from the Angelic Doctor. No comment from Averroes either: the Passage did not get into Arabic.44

41 In reaching which I have been helped by discussion with Michel Crubellier.
43 In the Venice 1562 edition of the Metaphysics in Bessarion’s Latin translation, accompanied by a Latin text of Averroes’ commentary, although not in the earlier edition of 1552, the Passage is presented (without comment from Averroes of course!) in a Latin version which, the reader is told, was prepared for teaching purposes by Kyriacos Strozza.
The ancient commentators on Aristotle speak frequently enough of τελεία ἐνέργεια or of ἐνέργεια κυρίως, contrasting this with ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, but to my knowledge not one of them uses the single word ἐνέργεια in the sense of the Passage, as equivalent to τελεία ἐνέργεια.

The only clear echo of the Passage I have been able to discover comes from medieval Byzantium. Michael of Ephesus, commenting on Aristotle’s account of pleasure in NE 10. 2, obviously knows the Passage, and uses it to good effect. But given that Michael is the same person as Pseudo-Alexander, we have just seen both A5 and M=F testifying that he did not find it in the copy of the Metaphysics he used when writing his commentary! I shall return to Michael in a final Postscript (Section 16 below).

Meanwhile, let me simply mention here that there is scholarly dispute about whether, when Plotinus in Enneads 6. 1 [42], 16 ff. criticizes the Aristotelian account of change as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής, he has the Passage in view as well as Physics 3. 1–3, from which he quotes. The issue is best reserved for Appendix 2 below, where I argue, controversially, that Plotinus’ remarks and the discussion they inspired among later Platonists show a striking absence of acquaintance with the Passage. There is certainly no sign of the Passage in Enneads 2. 5 [25], a treatise which starts from the question

45 Samples, all of them commenting on passages where modern scholars are tempted to invoke the narrow meaning given to ἐνέργεια in the Passage: Them. In DA 55. 6–12, 112. 25–33 Heinz; Philop. In DA 256. 20–257. 37 Hayduck; Simpl. (?) In DA 126. 2–3, 264. 25–265. 16 Hayduck. A particularly clear account of the difference between τελεία ἐνέργεια and κύριως, which is ἀτελής ἐνέργεια, is Philop. Alert. 64. 22–65. 26 Rabe. In a work that long-windedly dots every possible I and crosses every possible T, it is hard to believe that the author would not have drawn on, or at least mentioned, the Passage—had he known of its existence. I infer that he did not.

46 P. Henry and H.-R. Schwyzer (eds.), Plotini Opera (3 vols.; Paris and Brussels, 1951–73) [‘Henry–Schwyzer’], ad loc. cite the Passage, but A. H. Armstrong, Plotinus with an English Translation (7 vols.; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1966–88), vi. Enneads VI 1–5 [‘Armstrong’], does not. Brague, Monde, 454 with n. 2, is sceptical. I agree with him that ch. 16 can be understood without reference to the Passage. If ch. 18 seems to operate with some sort of contrast between κύριως and ἐνέργεια, that can be explained as the product of Plotinus’ own dialectic in chs. 16 and 17. The recent discussion of this dialectic in R. Chiardadonna, Sostanza movimento analogia: Plotino critico di Aristotele [‘Chiardadonna’] (Naples, 2002), ch. 2, does appeal to the Passage. So too I. Croese, Simplicius on Continuous and Instantaneous Change: Neo-Platonic Elements in Simplicius’ Interpretation of Aristotelian Physics [‘Croese’] (Utrecht, 1998), ch. 4, entitled ‘The Late Neo-Platonic interpretation of the motion–energia distinction’. Yet Damascius is a late Neoplatonist who can write as if it is a matter of course that ἐνέργειαι are either τέλεια or ἀτελής (In Philel. 191 Western). Returning to 6. 1. 16 ff., Gwenaille Aubry points out to me that the absence of the term τράχεια in a Plotinian text which is bent on distinguishing ἐνέργεια from ποίησις, makes it doubtful that its author has the Passage in mind.
whether τὸ ἐνέργεια ἐλναί is the same as, or different from, ἀ ἐνέργεια. Nor in two treatises on happiness, 1. 4 [46] and 1. 5 [36].

A good way to appreciate how contingent were the factors that brought the Passage into our editions is to study the route by which it got into the Aldine. Sicherl has shown that the ‘Druckvorlage’ of the Aldine was Par. 1848 (Q*, c. 1470). Q* is a descendant of Vind. Phil. 64 (J¹), and J¹ has the Passage, presumably by ‘contamination’ from D*, which was one of Brockmann’s positive results. Now J¹ is one of the most copied manuscripts of all time, as can be seen from the stemma. What is interesting is that, while four of its descendants have the Passage, three of them do not. Why the difference?

Go back to D* (written for Bessarion around 1443) and the annotation by a later hand mentioned at the end of Brockmann’s letter (above, p. 230). Attached to the beginning of the Passage, the annotation reads: ζ(ημείωσις)αί ὅτι τὸ πέπειβόλησκον ὑπὸ εὐφράσεις ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὀδὸν ἐνέργεια (‘Note that up to τὸ μὲν ὀδὸν ἐνέργεια is missing in some books’). The identical annotation, with the identical sign ≅ linking annotation to the relevant part of the text, is found not only in D*’s direct descendant Marc. 200 (Q), but also in J¹. In J¹, moreover, the annotation is in the same hand as the main text and there is a line drawn in the left vertical margin to clarify the reference of the annotation. This line has been mistaken in modern times for a mark of deletion. It is presumably a similar mistake that leads Ambr. L 117 sup. (M*), Salm. M 45 (d), and Paris. Suppl. 204 (U*) to omit the Passage without indicating the fact. By contrast, Paris. Suppl. 332 (Y) at fos. 313–14 neatly copies Passage, sign, and annotation exactly as it appears in J¹ but without the marginal line; Vat. 257 (V*) inserts ζημια at the beginning and end of the Passage without specifying what is to be noted; while Neap. III D 35 (N*) includes the Passage in its main text with no trace of annotation. Had the scribe of Q* thought along the same lines as the scribe of U*, the Passage would not have appeared in the Aldine and the

47 M. Sicherl, ‘Handschriftliche Vorlagen der edition princeps des Aristoteles’, Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, 8 (1976), 1–90; acknowledged by Harlfinger at p. 26 n. 36 bis, too late to redraw the lower right-hand quarter of his stemma (Plate 1), where a, a”, a” designate successive editions of the Aldine.

48 Harlfinger, 25.

49 Thereby providing yet another independent confirmation of Harlfinger’s stemma.

world might well not have known what it was missing until Brandis collated A for his school edition of the Metaphysics (1823) and for Bekker’s Berlin Academy edition of 1831. As it is, Q is like N in that it simply transmits the Passage as part of the main text with no indication that it has ever been questioned. Aldus would have seen no reason to worry.

Let us dwell a moment on contingency. The manuscript tradition now before you in Plate 1 shows that not all ancient readers of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (I suspect, rather few) would meet the Passage. Its quiet entry via Q into the tradition of modern publication ensured that lots of us would come to find it familiar, hard to think away, hence hard to suppose it might have been unavailable to many ancient students of Aristotle. None the less, not all moderns have succumbed.

Once the Passage was included in the first Aldine (1498), it was printed in the Greek text of editions by Erasmus (1531, 1539; reissued 1550), Turrissanius (1552), and Sylburg (1583). But not in the Basel Latin translation of 1542. In 1590 Isaac Casaubon put the Passage in square brackets, on the grounds that, although it is in the manuscripts (sc. the manuscripts he knows or knows of), it was unknown to the old Latin translators and to Alexander; his brackets and note reappear in a series of editions by W. du Val (1619, 1629, 1654), the brackets alone in Mauro’s Latin version with commentary (1658) and in Weisse’s edition of the Greek (1843). The Passage is completely omitted in Thomas Taylor’s English translation of 1801. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire (1879), having had the benefit

91 C. A. Brandis (ed.), Aristotelis et Theophrasti Metaphysica, ad veterum codicum manuscriptorum fidem recensita indicibusque instructa in usum scholarum edidit [‘Brandis ed.’] (Berlin, 1823), vii, looks forward to Bekker’s big edition, the preface to which (Bekker, vol. 1, p. iii) makes it clear that they shared the task of travelling around Europe to inspect the 101 manuscripts there listed (Bekker, vol. 1, pp. iii–vi) and divided the responsibilities of preparing the final product on behalf of the Berlin Academy. Both note in their apparatus criticus that the Passage is omitted in certain manuscripts, although only Bekker specifies these as ET and only he records the crossing out in A; both note Α’’s δεινόζει for δεινόζευ ή at 1048a35. Brandis’s apparatus ascribes Φ to τοῦ συναξιούμενον καὶ πολλαῖς λειτουργοῖς τοῦ Ἀλεξ.’


93 T. Taylor, The Metaphysics of Aristotle, translated from the Greek (London, 1801), 210 n.: ‘Several lines follow this word [γνώσεις] in the printed text which are
of Bonitz’s emendations when translating the Passage, still found
the result so unsatisfactory that he complained in his note ad loc.,
‘peut-être eût-il mieux valu le passer tout à fait sous silence, comme
l’ont fait Alexandre d’Aphrodise et Bessarion’. We should prepare
to think the unthinkable.

Ross writes:

It is perfectly clear that neither EJ nor A\(^b\) should be followed exclusively.
But the weight of the Greek commentators and of the medieval
translation is decidedly on the side of EJ, and I have accordingly followed this group
of manuscripts, except where the evidence of the Greek commentators, or
the sense, or grammar, or Aristotelian usage . . . turns the scale in favour
of A\(^b\).\(^4\)

For the particular case of book Z, this judgement has recently been
strengthened by Michael Frede and Günther Patzig. They have
produced a Greek text of Z which aims to follow the z tradition of
EJ, not exclusively, but wherever possible. The result, in my view,
is a triumph. The text is harder to read than Jaeger’s, to be sure, but
that is the point. For A\(^b\), as they put it, systematically smooths out
the crabiness of Aristotle’s treatise style, sometimes as the result
of misunderstanding.\(^5\)

Z is only one book of the *Metaphysics*. We may not infer from
one book to the rest. But we should, none the less, take note of
a possibility: in \(\Theta\) too the balance in favour of the z branch may
be even stronger than Ross described. Let this be the cue for my
alternative to Jaeger’s suggestion that the Passage originated as an
addition by Aristotle himself, which must therefore have been lost
or excised from the EJ tradition (branch z) at a fairly early stage.

Look at the emendations all over the Passage in your Greek text.
As Bonitz said, before he applied his magic touch,

Sed librariorum error, ex quo omissus est in quibusdam exemplaribus
universus hic locus, idem ad singula videtur verba pertinuisse; ea enim
tot scatent corruptelis, ut non alia Metaphysicorum pars cum iis possit
comparari.\(^6\)

not to be found in the Commentary of Alexander, and are not translated either by
Bessarion or Argyropylus, the most antient translators of Aristotle. I have, therefore,
 omitted them in my version, as undoubtedly spurious.\(^7\)

\(^4\) Ross, vol. i, pp. clxv–clxv.
\(^5\) Consult their introduction, vol. i, ch. 1, ‘Zum griechischen Text’.
\(^6\) Bonitz, 397. Brague, *Monde*, 436–7, would minimize the extent of corruption
As Ross said afterwards, 'The text has been vastly improved by Bonitz.' An obvious hypothesis to explain the extent of corruption is that the Passage began as an annotation in the β tradition, written in a margin where it was cramped for space or liable to damage (fraying, finger wear, moisture, etc.). That is why so many vitally important words now appear as supplements, in angled brackets. They were missed out when, at some later point in the β tradition, the annotation was mistakenly copied into the main text.

On this hypothesis, the Passage is a fragment of Aristotelian philosophy from some work now lost to us. The annotator could be quite late, as late as such works were still around to be consulted. There is no need at all to think of ancient editors, let alone of an addition signalled somehow by Aristotle himself for inclusion in the next copying out of Θ. Aristotle is the last person to have reason for writing the aberrant terminology of the Passage into the main text of Θ.

7. This brings us to the question of motive. What was the annotation meant to explain or illuminate? Several possibilities come to mind:

(i) The text it best explains is Θ 8, 1050a23–b2, already quoted. The distinction there between ἐνέργειαι which aim at a further product and those which are their own end is parallel to the distinction drawn in the Passage between πρᾶξεις which aim at a further product and those which are their own end. The motive for a marginal note would be to tell readers of Θ that elsewhere Aristotle marks the distinction with special terminology.

The snag is that Θ 8 is over two Bekker pages on from Θ 6. How by hypothesizing that the Passage began as a hastily scribbled note from Aristotle to himself. But then why was it not transmitted in the ζ tradition?

57 Ross, ii. 253. To verify this observation, try making sense of the Passage as printed in Bekker. Schwegler made a noble effort with both text and translation, but the strain is evident on nearly every line. Yet it should be added that in Bonitz’s apparatus every single emendation is marked ‘fort.’ i.e. ‘perhaps’; his commentary is similarly modest and hesitant about restoring the Passage.

58 An important, well-known case of this kind is 415, 986b29–30, where a marginal note about the relative dates of Pythagoras and Alcmaeon has been written into the text of E, but is unknown both to Alexander and to the A2 tradition.

59 cf. J. H. von Kirchmann, Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles, übersetzt, erläutert und mit einer Lebensbeschreibung des Aristoteles versehen (2 vols.; Berlin, 1871), ii. 50–1 n. 815, who rightly finds the Passage so irrelevant to its context in Θ that he suggests it may have been interpolated into the text ‘aus einem anderen Werke des Aristoteles’.
would a note on Θ 8 get written into the text of Θ 6? Either (a) by
carelessness or (b) by design. (a) is not impossible. For example,
a learned reader thinks the Passage should be in the main text of
Θ 8, but his copyist misunderstands the directions he has been
given. (b) supposes a learned reader who thinks that the Passage
is genuinely relevant to Θ 6 and has it written there. Why not, if
an outstanding scholar like Ross finds it ‘quite appropriate to its
context’?

(ii) Alternatively, the annotation was a comment on Θ 6. Either
(a) by someone who failed to see, as have many others since, that
the Passage addresses a different question from the rest of Θ 6, or
(b) by someone who knew that very well and wished only to point
out that elsewhere Aristotle takes a different tack from the one he
follows in the earlier part of Θ 6.

A different tack on what? On a sentence in Θ 6 that might well dis-
turb a reader who knows the Passage, or *NE* 10, or *Metaphysics* A.
The sentence, quoted above, p. 222, is 1048b8–9:

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναµιν, τὰ δὲ ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινὰ ὕλην.

Some are related as change to capacity, while others are related as substance
to some matter.

Once the analogical extension is completed, these are the two head-
ings under which all instances of the contrast between δύναµις and
ἐνέργεια are subsumed: some are contrasted (C) as δύναµις to κίνησις,
others (S) as ἐνέργεια to οὐσία. Examples under the second heading, the
one Θ is really interested in, are the Hermes in the wood, the half-
line in the whole (1048b32–3), the matter as opposed to what is
separated out of it, and the unworked up as opposed to what it is
worked up into (1048b3–4). The disturbing bit is the examples
Aristotle cites under the first head, as δύναµις to κίνησις: knowledge
vs. contemplation, the craft of building vs. building, sleeping vs.
waking, sight vs. seeing (1048a34–b2). Subtract building, and in
each case the second term is the sort of item which the Passage calls
ἐνέργεια in contrast to κίνησις. Subtract waking and seeing, and what
remains is an activity that Aristotle in *NE* 10 and *Metaphysics* A
ascribes to God: contemplation, theorizing, the exercise of know-
ledge.

Now in Θ 6, 1048b8, the noun κίνησις is used broadly to cover
a builder’s active agency as well as the passive change undergone
by the bricks: it picks up both κυνεῖ and κυνείσθαι from 1048b28–9. We know that Aristotle’s God κυνεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον. But that describes God’s relation to the rest of the cosmos. Contemplation is what he is, his οὐδα (A 6, 1071 b 19–20), his life (A 7, 1072a 26–8), his pleasure (1072b 16). Contemplation is what makes him the most excellent of all beings (A 9, 1074a 18–21). Any student of Aristotle could think it misleading to say that God is κίνησις or that his contemplating is κίνησις. Especially since κίνησις usually refers to passive change (κυνείσθαι), which would imply that God, the great Contemplator, undergoes change. A Byzantine cleric might well agree with Philoponus (Aet. 4. 4) that the very thought is blasphemous. Someone who knew the Passage might well think to write a marginal note to show that Aristotle knew better, that elsewhere νόησις is not κίνησις but ἐνέργεια.60

This last suggestion, (iiib), would be my preferred choice for a story about how the Passage began its journey into the text of Θ 6. But let imagination be reined in here. It is enough that once the marginal note hypothesis is accepted, to account for extreme textual disrepair in the Passage, plausible stories can be told about how it got into the main text. The next question is what to say about our newly discovered fragment of Aristotle.

8. The style is that of the treatises rather than the published ‘exoteric’ works: no connecting particle in 1048b 25, neither verbs nor connectives in 29–30. As Jaeger says, ‘oratio est admodum dura et obscura’. The best clue as to its original context is the word πρᾶξις, which does not occur elsewhere in Θ. This has a wide spread of meanings, but not endlessly wide. In biology almost any function

60 Indeed, C. Natali, ‘Movimenti ed attività: l’interpretazione di Aristotele, Metaph. Θ 6’, Elenchos, 12 (1991), 67–90 at 70 and 76 (repr. in C. Natali, L’Action efficace: études sur la philosophie de l’action d’Aristote (Louvain-la-Neuve, Paris, and Dudley, Mass., 2004), 31–52), suggests that the Passage is ‘una glossa di Aristotele a 1048b34–5’: Aristotle wanted to clarify the status of θεωρήσα in those lines. But I suspect that by ‘glossa’ Natali means ‘explanation’, not a marginal note, in which case my previous objection stands: why does Aristotle in the sequel continue to use ἐνέργεια in the same broad sense as it had before the Passage? The same objection tells against two other attempts to make the Passage fit into Θ 6: (i) S. Menne, ‘The Origins of Aristotle’s Concept of ἐνέργεια: ἐνέργεια and δόμωμα’, Ancient Philosophy, 14 (1994), 73–114 at 106–7, has it ‘repair the damage’ done by the broad (and, he claims, chronologically early) use of κίνησις at 1048b 8; (ii) T. H. Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles (Oxford, 1988), 564 n. 19, suggests that the actualities that Aristotle identifies with forms also meet the present-perfect test, e.g. ‘x is a statue’ and ‘x has been a statue’ are both true if either is.
of living things, from heavenly bodies down through animals to plants, may count as a πράξις: De caelo 2. 12, 292\textsuperscript{a}1–2; DA 2. 4, 415\textsuperscript{a}18–22; De sensu 1, 436\textsuperscript{a}4; HA 8. 1, 589\textsuperscript{b}3; 10, 596\textsuperscript{b}20–1; PA 1. 5, 645\textsuperscript{b}14–35; GA 1. 23, 731\textsuperscript{b}25; cf. NE 7. 14, 1154\textsuperscript{a}20.\textsuperscript{61} But the word does not consort easily with inanimate things. When we turn to the first chapter of the Nicomachean Ethics, we find that some πράξεις aim at an end beyond themselves, others just at the ἐνέργεια, the doing of the action itself. But the Ethics also has a narrower use of πράξις, confined (as the Passage confines it) to things done for their own sake: 6. 2, 1139\textsuperscript{b}35–4; 6. 5, 1140\textsuperscript{b}6–7; cf. 1. 8, 1098\textsuperscript{b}18–20; Pol. 7. 3, 1325\textsuperscript{b}16–21. A good example is the second of the passages just listed:

τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἔτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἀν ἐγὼ ἐστὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια τέλος.

For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end. (trans. Ross)

If Aristotle is going to restrict πράξις, or πράξεις τελείως, or the more general term ἐνέργεια, to things done for their own sake, the most likely context is an ethical one. That would fit the inclusion of eβ ζην and εὐδαιμονεῖν among the examples in Θ 6 (their perfects, not previously attested, may have been dreamt up by Aristotle for the purpose) and give relevance to the statement that with these you don’t have to stop, as you do when you are slimming someone (1048\textsuperscript{a}26–7). I shall reinforce this suggestion later with an argument to show that the Passage cannot have started life in a physical treatise.

But of course there may be ethical stretches, long or short, in

\textsuperscript{61} The inclusion of plants in the De caelo and of recuperation in the Nicomachean Ethics passage respectively should alleviate the concern of M.-T. Liske, ‘Kinesis und Energie bei Aristoteles’, Phronesis, 36 (1991), 161–78 at 161, that Aristotle would hardly count recuperation and becoming something as ‘Handlungen’. R. Polansky, ‘Energie in Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX’, Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1983), 160–70 (repr. in A. Preus and J. P. Anton (eds.), Aristotle’s Ontology (Albany, NY, 1992), 211–23), correctly points out that all the ἐνέργεια exemplified in the Passage are psychical, since all involve soul, but incorrectly (n. 18) allows this to be equivalent to P. S. Mamo’s claim in his ‘Energie and Kinesis in Metaphysics Θ, 6.’, Appeiron, 4 (1979), 24–34, that they are all mental processes, which living is not. Polansky’s exclusion of plant life (pp. 165, 168), which would narrow the range of ἐνέργεια yet further, is a non sequitur from the premiss that nutrition and reproduction are not themselves ἐνέργειαι in the narrow sense. To his credit he does, however, point out (p. 164) that most of the κινήσεως mentioned (being slimmed, learning, being cured, walking, building) are equally ‘psychical’, being confined to animate things. Only coming to be and movement have wider scope.
non-ethical writings. One remarkable example is De caelo 2. 12, 292a22—b25, where value theory is brought in to solve problems about the motion of the heavenly bodies. A small-scale example is Θ 8, 1050b1—2, the parenthesis about happiness at the end of the passage quoted earlier, which Ross wrongly describes as a ‘digression’.

Even the Physics finds it relevant at one point to say that happiness is a sort of πράξις. Ethical considerations are seldom far from Aristotle’s mind, whatever he is writing on. All we can say at this stage is that the Passage looks ethical in character, and leave future editors of Aristotelis Fragmenta to decide where to print it. I will propose a more positive location later.

PART II: MEANING

9. Now for the philosophical content. The discussion in the scholarly literature is largely focused on the so-called ‘tense test’: φινγ is an ἐνέργεια if, and only if, from the present tense (whether Englished as ‘x φις’ or as ‘x is φινγ’) we may infer ‘x has φεδ’. If we may not infer the perfect from the present, φινγ is a κινήσεις. Thus seeing is an ἐνέργεια because ‘Theaetetus sees Socrates’ implies ‘Theaetetus has seen Socrates’, but building is a κινήσεις because ‘Ictinus is building a temple’ does not imply ‘Ictinus has built a temple’; on the contrary, it implies that the temple he is presently building (which may be his first) is not yet built. There is much to say, much has been said, about this test as a criterion for distinguishing ἐνέργειαι from κινήσεις. But why suppose that inferences are what Aristotle has in view?

On the face of it, all we find in the Passage is a string of conjunctions:

At the same time we see and have seen, understand and have understood, . . . while it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured. (104b23—5; trans. after Ross)

It takes argument to show that these and other expressions of the form ‘at the same time φ and φ’ indicate entailments from φ to φ.

So far as I know, the first to appreciate this point was J. L. Ackrill

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62 Ross ad loc.: ‘The reference to εἶδαμονία is a digression.’
63 Phys. 2. 5, 197b5: ἢ δ’ εἶδαμονία πράξις τις εἵπερθεία γάρ; cf. Pol. 7. 3, 1325b32.
in his pioneering article on the Passage. The argument he provided was convincing (see below), with the result that the main focus of subsequent debate has been on inference from the present to the perfect. What few have remarked upon is this. In nearly all Aristotle’s instantiations of ‘at the same time $p$ and $q$’, $p$ is present and $q$ perfect. But just once it is the other way round:

$\varepsilon\pi\rho\alpha\varepsilon\ kai\ \dot{o}\rho\dot{a}\ \dot{e}\mu\alpha\ \tau\alpha\ \alpha\nu\tau\omicron\$, kai $\nu\nu\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\iota\ \nu\varepsilon\omicron\nu\kappa\iota\nu\kappa$.

One has seen and sees the same thing at the same time, understands and has understood (the same thing at the same time). (1048b 33–4)

If the second limb of this chiasmus is treated as licence to infer ‘$x$ has understood’ from ‘$x$ understands’, by parity of reasoning the first should license inferring from ‘$x$ has seen’ to ‘$x$ sees’.

This suggestion has one advantage. If ‘at the same time $p$ and $q$’ asserts a biconditional, not just a one-way entailment, then Aristotle’s putting the point as a conjunction is logically less sloppy than it would otherwise appear. If he has a two-way connection in mind, it no longer matters that he does not spell out whether it is $p$ that entails $q$ or vice versa. His thought could be put as follows: ‘For all times $t$, $p$ and $q$ are true together at $t$ or false together at $t$.’

A second advantage is that it helps to explain why Aristotle should make a point of saying that, where κωφήεις are concerned, present and perfect are different (1048b 30–3: ἐτερον). If in the case of ἐννεγείας, by contrast, present and perfect are the same, they had better be mutually entailing.

The obvious objection is that from Theaetetus’ having seen Soc-

44 ‘The alternative interpretation he was arguing against has it that ‘at the same time $p$ and $q$ expresses the logical compatibility of $p$ and $q’. This idea is taken up by S. Waterlow, Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics [‘Waterlow’] (Oxford 1982), 183 ff., and endorsed by T. Potts, ‘States, Activities and Performances’ [Potts], Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 39 (1965), 65–84 at 66–7, while Russo actually translates ‘è possibile nello stesso tempo vedere e aver già visto’ (A. Russo, Aristotele: opere, vol. vi. Metafisica (Rome and Bari, 1973)), etc. But surely ‘at the same time $p$ and $q$ asserts actual joint truth, not just the possibility of joint truth. When Aristotle, in a related context, does want to speak of the possibility of joint truth, he uses the modal verb ἰδικείαθαι (SE 2, 178b9–28, discussed below).

46 ‘The one exception I have noted is Potts, 66.

47 I take το αντό as the object of the verbs in this sentence, not their subject. All the other illustrative examples in the Passage are verbs with no subject expressed, this being an idiom Aristotle often uses (especially in Topics and Rhetoric) to indicate that it does not matter what the subject is; in the felicitous terminology of J. Brunschwig, Aristotle: Topiques, texte établi et traduit (Paris, 1967), pp. lxxxix and 138 n. 2, the absence of a subject may be regarded as ‘un variable en blanc’.

48 On construing ἐτερον as predicate, not with Ross as subject, see n. 89 below.
rates it does not follow that he sees him now. This objection assumes that the perfect refers to the past, either directly or indirectly. Direct reference to the past is characteristic for the perfect in Latin (‘Veni, vidi, vici’), and in spoken French or spoken Italian, where the perfect is often a simple past tense (like the past definite in literary French and Italian) which would go over into English as an aorist of the form ‘x ἤδη’: ‘[Hier] j’ai lu votre livre et puis . . .’, ‘Io sono arrivato [due mesi fa] e dopo . . .’. In spoken German too the perfect is a past tense: ‘[Gestern] habe ich Brot gekauft’. But English preserves a distinction between ‘x ἤδη’ and ‘x has ἤδη’, the perfect being a tense of present time. Consider the difference between ‘I lost my passport’ and ‘I have lost my passport’. The second implies, as the first does not, that at the time of speaking the passport is still lost. This is indirect reference to the past. Rather than referring directly to a past event, the perfect in English commonly expresses the continuing present relevance of some past event. ‘I have come, I have seen, I have conquered’ would sound bizarre unless we imagine Caesar still in Britain. And it is now much too late for you or me to say, in the third person, ‘Caesar has invaded Britain’.

As Goodwin’s Syntax of Greek Moods and Tenses put it long ago in 1897, ‘The perfect, although it implies the performance of the action in past time, yet states only that it stands completed at the present time. This explains why the perfect is classed with the present as a primary tense, that is, as a tense of present time.’

In ancient Greek the so-called resultative perfect behaves very

68 The bracketed time-references are of course optional.

69 Here I am indebted to Stephen Makin. Interestingly, the Stoics reported by Sextus Empiricus, M. 8. 254–6, treat constructions with the verb μέλλειν (not as future but) as present tense with indirect reference to the future, in parallel to their analysis of the Greek perfect as, like the English, present tense with indirect reference to a past event. Were it to be correct, as claimed by M. J. White, ‘Aristotle’s Concept of τὸ χρόνον and the διάνυσις–κόμως Distinction’ ['White'], Journal of the History of Philosophy, 18 (1980), 253–63 at 254, that ‘x has ἤδη’ is true if, and only if, at some earlier time ‘x ἤδη’ or ‘x is ἤδη’ was true, English would lose the difference between perfect and aorist. We could say, both truly and appositely, ‘Caesar has invaded Britain’. The fact is, we can’t.

70 W. W. Goodwin, Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb ['Goodwin'] (London, 1897), 13–14. Plato, Parm. 141 d–e, lists γίνομαι as a verb both of past (when coupled with πέρα) and of present time (coupled with χάριν, as e.g. at Plato, Rep. 354 c). Ignored by philosophical commentators on the Parmenides, this interesting feature is discussed by P. Chantraine, Histoire du parfait grec ['Chantraine'] (Paris, 1927), 159–62, following the seminal contribution of A. Meillet, ‘Le sens de γίνομαι: à propos de Parméniade 141’, Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes, 48 (1924), 44–9. Proclus, In Tim. i. 290. 23–6 Diehl, combines past and present
much like the perfect in English. 71 But there is also another, more ancient type of perfect which survives into the fourth century BC and beyond. Consider the following: γέγονα, δύσωκα, εἰσαθα, ἔσωκα, ἐστηκα, ἔληθα, μέμνημαι, οἶδα, πέφυκα, πέποθα, συμβέβηκα, τέθηκα. They are or can be wholly present, with no past reference at all. They are best analysed in terms of aspect rather than tense. Or consider a famous line of Empedocles: γαίη μὲν γάρ γαίαν ὄπωσάμεν, ὁδατι δ’ ὠδωρ, ‘With earth do we see earth, with water water’ (fr. 109. 1). ὄπωσάμεν is a perfect formation, but it functions as the sort of timeless present one finds in ‘The Sun sets in the West’, ‘Lions are mammals’; no competent translator would render ‘With earth have we seen earth . . .’. 72 Occasionally, English has a form to match: ‘I am persuaded’, ‘I am called’ could in a given context translate πέποθα and κέκληµαι better than ‘I have been persuaded’, ‘I was called’, while the Tailor of Gloucester’s ‘Alack, I am undone!’ might on occasion do justice to the Greek ὀίµοι.

Tense locates an event or situation in time: past, present, or future. (Pluperfect and future perfect are no exception, since they locate an event or situation before a previously specified past, or after a previously specified future.) Aspect, by contrast, views an event or situation as complete or incomplete. 73 Past, present, and future

when, to explain πώς γεγονός τό πῶς, he writes of the cosmos as ἀεὶ γεγονόμενον ἅµα καὶ γεγονέναι.

71 For a nice trio of examples see Plato, Gorg. 508 ξ 6–509 α τ. At least in English the resultative perfect should be treated in terms of tense, not aspect, since it has both imperfective and perfective forms, e.g. ‘I have been reading War and Peace’ vs. ‘I have read War and Peace’, the first of which is true rather more often than the second. This tells against Bauer’s counsel of despair (G. Bauer, ‘The English “Perfect” Reconsidered’, Journal of Linguistics, 6 (1970), 189–98 at 196): ‘the English perfect can neither be regarded as a tense nor as an aspect, but is a category in its own right’.

72 Many more examples of the two types of perfect, and a wonderful discussion of the evolution of the Greek perfect from aspect into tense, in Chantraine, ch. 7.

73 B. Comrie, Aspect: An Introduction to the Study of Verbal Aspect and Related Problems (Cambridge, 1976), is a helpful general introduction to this subject; Y. Duhoux, Le Verbe grec ancien: éléments de morphologie et de syntaxe historiques (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1992), 138 ff., is nice and clear on aspect in ancient Greek. For a monograph devoted to ways in which aspect is expressed in English, see L. J. Brinton, The Development of English Aspectual Systems: Aspectualizers and Post-Verbal Particles (Cambridge, 1988). One scholar of the Passage who has seen that the issue is aspect, not tense, is Kosman, ‘Substance’, 123–7. He too infers the sameness of present and perfect in the case of ἔληθησα, but he misses his best evidence by translating τὸ 148–33 the wrong way round: ‘At the same moment one sees and has seen’ (similarly H. Tredennick, Aristotle: The Metaphysics, with an English
may each be expressed in two different ways: an imperfective way that talks of an ongoing process, divisible into stages, or a perfective way that presents something whole and complete, without regard for internal temporal divisions. For an English example, contrast the imperfective ‘Next year I will be writing a book on Aristotle’ with the perfective ‘Next year I will write a book on Aristotle’: same tense, different aspect. It could matter a lot which form you used on your grant application.

For a Greek example, we may turn to Plato’s Protagoras, 316 b 3–4, where Protagoras asks whether Socrates and Hippocrates would like to hold their discussion with him (διαλέγομαι) in private or in company. Socrates replies that it makes no difference to him. Let Protagoras decide how he wishes to discuss (διαλέγεσαι) the matter of young Hippocrates’ education (316 c 3–4). In Greek, the translation (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1933–35). And he persists in trying to make the English perfect convey the purely aspectual meaning he wants, without even indirect reference to the past. Others who have shifted attention from tense to aspect are Potts, Penner, ‘Verbs’, A. D. P. Mourelatos, ‘Events, Processes, and States’ [‘Mourelatos’], Linguistics and Philosophy, 2 (1978), 415–34, repr. in P. J. Tedeschi and A. Zaenen (eds.), Tense and Aspect (New York and London, c. 1981), 191–212, D. W. Graham, ‘States and Performances: Aristotle’s Test’ [‘Graham’], Philosophical Quarterly, 30 (1980), 117–30, Furth, L. Jansen, Tun und Können: Ein systematischer Kommentar zur Aristoteles’ Theorie der Vermögen im neunten Buch der Metaphysik [‘Jansen’] (Frankfurt a.M., 2003), A. Linguisti, La felicità e il tempo: Plotino, Enneadi, I 4–I 5, con testo greco, introduzione, traduzione e commento [‘Linguisti’] (Milan, 2000). White, and M. Frede, ‘The Stoic Doctrine of the Tenses of the Verb’ [‘Tenses’], in K. Döring and T. Ebert (eds.), Dialektiker und Stocher: Zur Logik der Stoαι und ihrer Vorläufer (Stuttgart, 1993), 141–54, this last being a paper in which the Passage is seen as the stimulus (direct or indirect) for discussions of aspect in Diodorus Cronus, the Stoics, and later grammarians. While hating all these, especially Frede for his demonstration that the ancients themselves distinguished between tense and aspect, I maintain that, apart from R. Hope, Aristotle: Metaphysics, translated (New York, 1952), and Graham, no one has appreciated what drastic measures are required (see below) to produce an English version that highlights aspect rather than tense.

Recall n. 71 above. Faced with Aristotle’s statement at Metaph. 4 7, 1017a27–30 (cf. De int. 12, 211b9–10), that there is no difference between τὸ ἁμαρτός ἐγκαίνησις ἔστι and τὸ ἁμαρτός ἐγκαίνησις, or between τὸ ἁμαρτάνως βαθύτατον ἔστιν ἡ ῥήματος and τὸ ἁμαρτάνως βαθύτατον ἔστιν τῶν ῥήμων, R. A. Cobb, ‘The Present Progressive Periphrasis and the Metaphysics of Aristotle’, Phronesis, 18 (1973), 80–90, supposes that it puts all Greek present-tense statements on a par with the English present-progressive periphrasis ‘x is ping’. This would require English translators to go in for nonsensical locutions such as ‘He is knowing. . . . ’We are believing. . . . ’, not to mention that Cobb has to follow Ross in rendering ἐγκαίνων ἔστι by ‘He is recovering’ rather than ‘He is in good health’, for which the only parallel offered by LSJ comes from the Book of Ezekiel! On the contrary, Aristotle’s message is that, while being is involved in every category, it is a different kind of being in each.
dependent moods of the verb (subjunctive, optative, infinitive, imperative) generally differ in aspect, not tense, and this enables Plato to mark a subtle difference between Socrates and the sophist. Protagoras’ aorist infinitive already envisages a definite end to the discussion, which he eventually declares at 361 b 6: ‘Now it is time to turn to something else’. Socrates’ present infinitive is characteristically open-ended: he will go on for as long as the interlocutor is willing. A less ‘studied’ Platonic example is the contrast between the imperfect and the aorist of one and the same verb at Ion 530 A 8: ‘Were you competing [ ἤγωνισέ] and how did the competition go for you [ ἤγωνισα]?’

True, Aristotle is not interested in verbs as such, but what they stand for; if he was interested in the verbs themselves, he would hardly treat living well and living as distinct examples (1048a25–7).

But if we do translate into linguistic terms, to help our own understanding, then Aristotle’s contrast between κινήσεις and ἐνέργειας comes out as a contrast between verbs whose present tense has imperfective meaning, e.g. ‘to slim’ or ‘to build’, and verbs whose present tense has perfective meaning, e.g. ‘to see’. We shall later (pp. 259–60) find Aristotle remarking on the fact that the difference is purely semantic, not a difference which is grammaticalized in the morphology of the relevant Greek verbs.

All this makes it difficult to translate the Passage into English. In English we cannot eliminate the perfect’s (indirect) reference to the past. Therefore we must insert a counteracting phrase. The exceptions involve indirect discourse or the presence of ἂν. For a full elucidation, see Goodwin, 22–47. Although he does not use the term ‘aspect’, that is what he is describing.

The dramatic difference between the two infinitives was first brought to my attention by Heda Segvic. I discuss this and other character-revealing aspectual contrasts in the Protagoras in M. F Burnyeat, ‘The Dramatic Aspects of Plato’s Protagoras’ [ ‘Aspect’ s], forthcoming.

Borrowed from Mourelatos, 195.

With Ackrill, ‘Distinction’, 127: ‘The perfect [sc. of an ἐνέργεια verb] can always be used of the period preceding a moment at which the present can be used’, and the phrasing ‘ X has (just) 5ed Y’ in Waterlow, 188–9, compare Frede, ‘Tenses’, 146: ‘Aristotle clearly does not think that the fact that somebody who grasps something has grasped it, shows that somebody who grasps something must have grasped it at some previous time.’ While agreeing with Frede, I add that, equally clearly, as Ackrill stresses, Aristotle thinks that, in the case of κίνησις, someone who is moving something has moved it earlier! This is his thesis that there is no first moment of motion, set out inphysics § 6.

Compare Brague Monde, 460–1, 468–9, 471–2, on the ‘acrobacies’ required when translating the Passage into French.
Two of Aristotle’s examples may help: ἐὖ ζήτα καὶ ἐὖ ἐζήκε ἅµα, καὶ εὔδαιµονεὶ καὶ εὔδαιµόνηκε. Translate: ‘at the same time x lives well and has achieved the good life’, 80 ‘x is happy and has achieved happiness’. For these cases at least, the objection is overcome. The entailment runs both ways: not only from ‘x lives well’ to ‘x has achieved the good life’, and from ‘x is happy’ to ‘x has achieved happiness’, but also from ‘x has achieved happiness/the good life’ to ‘x is happy/living well’. The counteracting phrase ‘has achieved’ enforces perfective meaning and makes the past irrelevant. It does not matter when happiness/the good life started. The assertion is that it is going on now, 81 complete at every moment. That is, there is no moment at which its goal is not (yet) achieved. Happiness, the good life, is continuing success. And so indeed is life itself (1048b27). Living things for Aristotle are self-maintaining systems. It is thanks to the threptic soul, whose function is nutrition and reproduction, that throughout life, be it long or short, they succeed in staying alive. A splendid example of perfective meaning. Present and perfect are indeed the same.

So much for the examples of ἐνέργειαι expressed by intransitive verbs. The other examples of ἐνέργειαι in the Passage involve transitive verbs, 82 for which we must supply, not only an object, as we did for slimming—the same object for both the present and the perfect—but also a phrase to counteract the English perfect’s reference to the past. Here goes: ‘x sees y’ implies, and is implied by, ‘x has got sight of y’ or ‘x has (got) y in view’; ‘x understands y’ implies, and is implied by, ‘x has understood y’; ‘x knows y’ implies, and is implied by, ‘x has achieved knowledge of y’.

I now offer a rendering of the whole Passage which attempts to convey its full meaning in plausible English. At this stage I keep to Jaeger’s text, except that at 1048b33 I prefer Ross’s solution: ἐστερον, καὶ κυκλίτα καὶ κεκίνηκεν.

Since of actions which have a limit none is an end, but all belong to the class of means to an end, e.g. slimming, and since the things themselves, when one is slimming them, 83 are in process of changing in this sense, that what

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80 Modern readers are at liberty to substitute ‘a good life’ for ‘the good life’.
81 Note the impropriety of coupling ‘x has achieved happiness’ with ‘x died last month’, which goes quite properly with ‘x achieved happiness’.
82 Similarly, the κύρης verbs include both transitive examples (learning, building) and intransitive ones (being cured, walking).
83 In taking adva as the object of some agent’s slimming, I follow Ross and the
is aimed at in the change is not yet present, these are not cases of action, or not at any rate of complete action. For none of them is an end. Action properly speaking is one in which the end is present. For example, at the same time one sees (a thing) and has (it) in view, and one is wise and has achieved wisdom, and one understands (something) and has understood (it), but it is not the case that (at the same time) one is learning (something) and has learned (it), or that (at the same time) one is being cured and has been cured. One lives well and has achieved the good life at the same time, and one is happy and has achieved happiness (at the same time). If that were not so, the action would at some time have to cease, as when one is slimming (someone). But as it is, this is not the case: one lives and (at the same time) has stayed alive.

Of these (actions), then, we should call one set changes, the other actualities. For every process of change is incomplete: slimming, learning, walking, building. These are changes, and they are certainly incomplete. For it is not the case that at the same time one is walking and has taken a walk, nor that one is building (something) and has built (it), nor again that one is becoming (something) and has become (it) or is being changed

communis opinio against Brague, Monde, 458, who construes aôrá as the means of slimming and translates, 'ces moyens, chaque fois que l'on fait maigrir, sont en mouvement de façon telle [aôraï referring forwards] qu'ils ne sont pas en euxmêmes [iôpâgya in its copulative use] les résultats en vue de quoi le mouvement (se produit). If this makes sense at all, it seems to be tautological. On the other hand, for translating aôrá I prefer Ross Tr, 'the things themselves when one is making them thin', to Ross Tr, 'the bodily parts themselves when one is making them thin', which forgets that the target of a slimming course may be the whole person, not just their tummy.

44 τάρσα must pick up 'actions which have a limit', not the nearer aôrá.

45 'Properly speaking' renders the intensifying καί before πράξεις in 1048-23; Penner, 'Verbs', 454, uses italics to the same effect: 'that in which the end inheres is an action'.

46 Ross translates 'would have had sometime to cease', followed by 'as it is, it does not cease' (emphasis added); likewise Furth and Makin. But ἐδέι ἄν is the sole main verb in the sentence, which continues in the present tense. For this reason I take the unfulfilled condition to be present, not past. 'Does not cease' comes dangerously close to implying that happiness and life never cease at all. I take it that Aristotle means living to be an obvious example to buttress the less obvious claim about living well. The point is well put by Makin, 142 (despite his translation): 'It would not make sense to ask whether Candy has finished living, seeing, or understanding the theorem (as opposed to having stopped doing those things).'


48 Or: 'has walked (to where one is going)'. Scholars commonly feel the need to supply a destination, as found at NE 10. 4, 1174-29-2. But 'has taken a walk' has perfective meaning even if the walking was merely a postprandial stroll.
(in some way) and has been changed (in that way), but they are different; as are one’s changing and one’s having changed (something). But one has got in view, and one sees, the same thing at the same time, and one understands (something) and has understood (it). The latter type (of action) I call actuality, the former change.

Call this Version A. Its sole purpose is to give readers a sense of how the Passage runs when the focus shifts from tense to aspect.

PART III: A REVISED TEXT

10. But prior to translation is establishing the text. Version A sticks closely to the printed text we are all familiar with. That text needs to be re-examined in the light of the hypothesis that the Passage began as a marginal annotation. For the hypothesis changes the ground rules for resolving difficulties of text and translation. The two recommendations that follow are a gift from David Sedley, very gladly received.

(i) When writing the Passage into the main text from a cramped margin, a scribe might well lose words, even important words, but it is much less likely that he would make additions. Additions, if any, would be due to subsequent attempts to clarify the obscurities of the Passage once it had entered the main text of branch ฎ, as attested by A^b, M, and C. Conclusion: let us try to eliminate as many editorial square brackets from the printed text as is feasible, on the grounds that they presume to diagnose an unwanted addition to the original text as it stood in the margin. (a) Jaeger’s bracketing of καὶ κυνεὶ καὶ κεκίνηκεν at 1048^b33 is plainly unnecessary. I have already chosen to read, with Ross, ἔτερον, καὶ κυνεὶ καὶ κεκίνηκεν. (b) In Version B below, an annotated rendering of the first few sentences of the Passage (1048^b18–23), I insist on retaining the ‘abstraction operator’ ἀντό, deleted by Christ on the grounds, hardly compelling, that ‘ἀντό et ἀντά variae lectiones esse videntur’. This decision was accepted by Ross without further explanation, and by Jaeger, who said ‘vel ὀντος abundat’, which I simply do not

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99 Taking ἔτερον, with most translators, as predicate, not subject to the verbs. By contrast, in his note ad loc. Ross renders, ‘It is not the case that a thing at the same time is being moved and has been moved; that which has been moved is different from that which is being moved, and that which has moved from that which is moving’: three falsehoods in a row! The versions in his Tr,” Tr.⁴, and Ross–Barnes hardly fare much better. Casting ἔτερον as subject only makes for trouble.
understand. One might alternatively diagnose dittography. I shall
defend αὖτον. Finally, only one, easily explicable pair of square
brackets will remain.
(ii) An inserted portion of text may contain anaphoric pronouns
whose reference in the original context was to something no longer
visible in the new environment. A nice illustration is the masculine
pronoun αὖτοι at *Metaph.* A 8, 1074b3, usually taken to pick up
the neuter θείων σωμάτων at 1074a30–1. Elsewhere I have argued
that 1074b38–b14 was originally written as the immediate sequel
to 1073a3–b38, so that αὖτοι picks up the planets (Venus, Mercury,
Jupiter, etc.) named at 1073b31–8. This is a case where the context
preceding the pronoun has not vanished. It has merely been sepa-
rated so that Aristotle can stop to do his calculation of the number
of intelligences needed to move the spheres postulated by the astro-
nomical systems of Eudoxus and Callippus; for which purpose he
reverts to his usual staccato style, in striking contrast to the litera-
riness of the preceding and following sections. A rare glimpse of
a process we cannot usually observe.

No wonder the most serious difficulties of text and translation are
located in the first portion of the Passage. That is the portion most
likely to become obscure as the result of being separated from an
erlier discussion we can no longer read. Accordingly, I now offer
Version B, an annotated rendering of the first few sentences, to try
out the possibilities opened up by the conclusions reached under
(i) and (ii). As with those conclusions, so too much of the detail to
follow is owed to David Sedley. All of it should be read as tentative
exploration, not a set of firm proposals. Changes to Jaeger’s text

80 Brague, *Monde,* 437–8, too would keep αὖτον, but in predicate position: ‘la cure
d’amaiissement est, par rapport au fait de faire maigir, justement cela’. This
is his translation of the manuscripts: τά μετά τοῦ ἤσχασιν ἤ ἤσχασιν αὖτον, ignoring
Bywater’s emendation τό for τοῦ and citing Δ 2, 1013b34–b35 (the only other oc-
currence of ἤσχασιν in Aristotle), as warrant for taking ἤ ἤσχασιν to cover all the
means—instruments as well as activities—to the completed action ἤσχασίας; αὖτο
he construes as a reference to τῶν μετὰ τὸ τέλος, so that ‘justement cela’ means ‘is a
member of the class of means to an end’. That strikes me as an awfully long-winded
way to secure the same result as Jaeger gets by simply deleting ἤ ἤσχασιν αὖτον, and
Δ 2 hardly justifies so distinguishing ἤσχασιν from ἤσχασίας, since the verb does
not appear in the chapter.

81 Burnyeat, *Map,* 141–5. The argument takes off from Friedrich Blass’s sug-
gestion (*Aristotelisches*, *Rheinisches Museum,* 30 (1875), 481–505) that, since both
stretches of text (1073a3–b38, 1074a38–b14) avoid hiatus (a mark of literary style),
they were copied out by Aristotle from his lost *De philosophia.* That they were not
originally written for A is further confirmed by the backwards-referring δέδεικται of
1073a5, for no such proof has preceded in the text of A as we have it.
are marked with an asterisk. Bold type marks a phrase discussed in the relevant numbered annotation.

Since of actions which have a limit none is an end, but all belong to the class of means to an end (1), e.g. slimming in the sense of the slimming process considered in itself [ὁλὸν τὸ ἱσχράνειν [ἡ ἰσχυραία] αὐτῷ*] (2), and since the things themselves one is slimming, when one is slimming them, are in process of changing in this sense, that the results aimed at in the change are not yet present (3), these are not cases of action, or not at any rate of complete action. For none of them is in itself (4) an end. It is in that former thing [ἐκείνη* without (ἡ)*] (5) that the end and the [retaining ἡ*] action are present (6).

(1) The partitive genitive τῶν is appropriate because κινήσεις are not the sole members of that class; if they were, nothing could be both an end and means to some further end. On the other hand, the emphatic ‘none’ excludes from present consideration actions which are both means and ends, in accordance with what appears to be a semi-technical meaning of πέρας, exemplified at DA 1. 3, 407'23-5: τῶν μὲν γὰρ πραγματικῶν νομοσεων ἐστι πέρας (πᾶσαν γὰρ ἐπέραν χάριν), αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαί . . . . ‘Practical thoughts have limits, for they are all for the sake of something else, whereas theoretical thoughts . . .’.

(2) One could remove the square brackets by printing ἡ if, but only if, ἡ ἰσχυραία αὐτῷ is a plausible Aristotelian phrase. On this, see below. Bonitz made αὐτῷ pick up τέλος, so that ἡ ἰσχυραία is the τέλος of τὸ ἱσχρανειν: ‘So ist z. B. das Ziel des Abmagern die Magerkeit’. Ross Tr. proposed to read just ὁλὸν ἡ ἰσχυραία αὐτῷ: ‘‘the process of making thin” is of this sort’, which reappears (without the inner quotation marks) in Ross–Barnes, but in his edition and Tr.* he favours τὸ ἱσχρανειν ἡ ἰσχυραία αὐτῷ, αὐτῷ . . . , crediting τὸ and ἡ to Bywater.

(3) With Ross Tr. I take the accusative absolute μὴ ὑπάρχοντα . . . κίνησις to elucidate ὁλῶς, the way they are changing. To Ross’s note, ‘αὐτὰ is curious, and some corruption may be suspected’, I respond that the word is curious, but might cease to be so if we could access its original context. Alternatively, it emphasizes the transition from the slimming process considered in itself to the items under treatment.

(4) Line 20’s αὐτῷ is still in force.

(5) ἐκείνη was printed in the Aldine and every subsequent edition
until Bonitz emended,\textsuperscript{92} as well as by Christ after him; iota subscript, often omitted in papyri and manuscripts, scarcely counts as an emendation.\textsuperscript{93} I propose that the pronoun picks up an earlier but now lost designation of the kind of thing that will soon be dubbed \textit{ἐνεργεία}. The Berlin Academy’s bracketed Latin version (on which see n. 26 above) renders the sentence thus: ‘\textquoteleft nec enim ea finis est, sed in illa inest finis et actio\textquoteright, where \textquoteleft ea\textquoteright corresponds to \textit{ταύτα} but \textquoteleft illa\textquoteright has no visible reference at all. Full marks to the unnamed translator!

(6) Since Bonitz this sentence has been doubly emended to yield the meaning ‘that movement in which the end is present is an action’ (Ross), with \textit{πρᾶξις} in predicative position. Version B puts \textit{ἡ πρᾶξις} in subject position alongside \textit{τὸ τέλος}, in line with the transmitted text. The idea of the action itself being present when the end is\textsuperscript{94} may be compared with \textit{NE 10. 4. 1174\textsuperscript{a} 19–21}: an instance of building is complete either at the moment it is finished or in the whole time \textit{up to and including} that finish. In the Passage \textit{αὐτό} abstracts from the finish, so that \textit{τὸ ἰσχνάινειν} cannot count as action, or at any rate not as a complete action; cf. \textit{αὐτὴν τὴν βαβίαν} at \textit{NE 10. 4. 1174\textsuperscript{a} 32}. Aristotle shifts from speaking of the act as \textit{being} or not being the \textit{telos} (1048\textsuperscript{b} 18 and 22) to saying that it \textit{contains} the \textit{telos} (1048\textsuperscript{b} 22).

In Version B the key to the whole passage is the retention of what I would call the ‘abstraction operator’ \textit{αὐτό} at line 20. The manuscript text, found in M and C as well as \textit{Α}, is \textit{τὸ ἰσχνάινειν ἡ ἰσχνασία αὐτό.} Bekker, Schweger, and Christ all print the transmitted \textit{τοῦ},\textsuperscript{95} but Bywater’s \textit{τὸ} for \textit{τοῦ} is accepted by both Ross and Jaeger. As a result, they have a problem with \textit{ἡ ἰσχνασία αὐτό.} Ross opts to follow Bywater in printing \textit{ἡ} for \textit{ἡ} at 1048\textsuperscript{b} 19, while Jaeger brackets

\textsuperscript{92} Both Ross and Jaeger cite Bonitz as proposing \textit{ἐκεῖνη ἡ} \textit{(misprinted in Jaeger’s apparatus as \textit{ἐκεῖνη ἡ})}. True enough for Bonitz’s apparatus, but in the commentary ad loc. he prints \textit{ἐκεῖνη ἡ}.

\textsuperscript{93} Ross’s apparatus does in fact report ‘\textit{ἐκεῖνη codd.}’, and Jaeger probably means to do the same (the iota subscript in his apparatus has mistakenly migrated to the immediately preceding \textit{ἐκεῖνη}), but this has to be (correct) inference from the grammar of \textit{ἐνεργεία}, not autopsy. For no subscript is visible in \textit{Α}. Christ, pp. vii–viii, reports that E is punctilious in writing iota subscript, whereas \textit{Α} hardly bothers.

Brockmann’s collation of the Passage in M and C (Appendix 1 below) found no iota subscript in either.

\textsuperscript{94} Similarly Brague, \textit{Monde}, 430, on both text and meaning.

\textsuperscript{95} Which Schweger, ii. 155 (cf. iv. 385), equates with \textit{τὸ τέλος}: ‘so ist die Magerkeit Zweck des sich Abmagerns’. A similar rendering in A. Lasson, \textit{Aristoteles: Metaphysik}, ins Deutsche übertragen (Jena, 1907), who would print \textit{ὅλον τὸ ἰσχνάινειν ἡ ἰσχνασία, αὐτὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα . . .} (p. xv).
The image contains a page from a book discussing the concepts of *kinēsis* vs. *energeia*.

The text discusses *η ἰσχνασία* as a reader's gloss on *τὸ ἰσχναίνειν*. Restoring *αὐτό*, as I propose to do, makes it essential to delete the two preceding words. Let me explain why.

Plato frequently couples the neuter *αὐτό* with a feminine or masculine noun, and not just in contexts involving the Theory of Forms. At *Rep.* 363 Α Adeimantus complains that the poets do not praise *δικαιοσύνην αὐτό*, but the consequences of a reputation for it; he does not mean they fail to praise the Platonic Form of Justice. At *Sym.* 199 B a question about *αὐτό τοῦτο πατέρα* is a question about a father—any father—in so far as he is a father. But the only Aristotelian examples of this usage recorded in Bonitz’s *Index Aristotelicus* s.v. *αὐτό* are references to Platonic Forms. My *TLG* search through the corpus under *αὐτό*, *αὐτοῦ*, *αὐτῷ* confirmed his finding: several thousand examples, but the only relevant ones are semi-quotes from Plato. On the other hand, it is Aristotelian usage to couple *αὐτό* with article plus infinitive:

*GA* 5. 8, 789'4–6: Suckling as such [*τὰ θηλάξεων αὐτό*] contributes nothing to the growth of teeth.

*NE* 9. 11, 1171'35–1: The very act of seeing one’s friends is pleasant [*αὐτὸ...τὸ ὅραν τοῖν φίλοις ἃδικό*].

*EE* 7. 12, 1244'29–30: If one were to cut off and abstract mere knowledge and its opposite [εἰ...τέ ἀποστέμοι καὶ ποιήσει τὸ γινώσκειν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ μή*].

*Pol.* 8. 3, 1338'1–3: Leisure of itself [*τὰ σχολάζειν...αὐτό*] is thought to give pleasure and happiness and a blessed life.

I conclude that the phrase *τὸ ἰσχναίνειν αὐτό* is well chosen to concentrate our minds on the slimming process as such, excluding its end and completion.

If this is accepted, *η ἰσχνασία* becomes a reader’s gloss—a correct gloss guided by *ἰσχνασία* at 1048'29—not, as Jaeger supposed, on *τὸ ἰσχναίνειν*, but on the full phrase *τὸ ἰσχναίνειν αὐτό*. Without much preceding context to clarify the point of the phrase, it was understandably found obscure. And once the gloss got copied into the main text between *ἰσχναίνειν* and *αὐτό*, the two successive nominatives led a scribe or reader who decided for *η* as *η*, not *η* or *η*, to change *τὸ* to *τοῦ*.

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So much for the square brackets. Doug Hutchinson has urged in correspondence that two pairs of angled brackets could go as well if we adopt Fonseca’s emendation of 1048b23: ὤρα ἄμα καὶ ἑώρακε καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νένοηκεν. Reducing Bonitz’s three verb pairs to two leaves a neat parallel with the pairs of contrasting pairs that follow in lines 24–6. I am mildly favourable to this idea.

Someone may say I have now cut the ground from under my feet, in that, if Version B is accepted, and Fonseca’s restoration of 1048b23 preferred to Bonitz’s, the Passage is no longer so corrupt as it was when I argued from its extreme textual disrepair to the marginal annotation hypothesis (pp. 240–1 above). Certainly, it is less corrupt. But removing a quantity of brackets leaves plenty of emending still to do. Bonitz’s emendation ἄμα for ἄλλα at lines 23 and 25 must certainly stand; in the manuscripts only lines 30 and 33 have ἄμα. Whatever the fate of φρονεῖ in line 23, we must supply ἑώρακε to twin with ὤρα. Bonitz’s (δεί) after δή at 1048b28 is extremely plausible too, rather more so than Schwegler’s λέγω/λέγομεν—unless it is thought sufficient to follow Brague in attributing imperative force to the bare infinitive λέγειν. Then there is Bywater’s crucially important τὸ for τοῦ at 1048b19, not to mention the iota subscript for ἐκεῖνη at 1048b22. Further doubts, worries, and improvements are recorded in the apparatus of Ross and Jaeger, but not endorsed by them. The Passage is still a highly damaged stretch of the Metaphysics.

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97 Petrus da Fonseca, Commentaria in Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros (4 vols.; Cologne, 1615–29 [1st edn. of Θ: 1664]), αδ ιν. Fonseca does not explain how he arrives at this proposal, but Hutchinson’s suggestion is that 1048b23’s φρονεῖ originated when the ἑώρακε needed after ὤρα got corrupted into φρονεῖ and was later ‘corrected’ into φρονεῖ. Alternatively, φρονεῖ might have originated as a gloss on νοεῖ.

98 Brague, Monde, 456 n. 9. While Plato quite often uses the infinitive that way, Bonitz, Index, 345’22–5, cites for such usage only the inauthentic Rhet. ad Alex. 23, 1434b18–19. Yet then he proceeds to a row of impeccably Aristotelian infinitives which have, he says, the force of a verbal noun in -τέων. Nearly all are from logical works, which will be relevant in sect. 14 below. A striking example, given the subject-matter of this paper, is Top. 6. 8, 146’13–16: πολλαί δέ καὶ εἰ γένεις ἐστι πρὸς δ ἀποδέχωμεν, ἡ γένεις οὐδέν γὰρ τῶν παρόντων δέδω καὶ μᾶλλον γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργειακόν καὶ γεγενήθη πέλει ἢ τὸ γένος καὶ ἀνίκητον.

99 Although Jaeger speaks in propria persona when his apparatus says that the sentence ἄλλη ἄλλα μαθάνει . . . ὑγίαστε at 1048b24–5 belongs after εἰδικολόγεσθε in line 26.
PART IV: UNIQUENESS

11. Let me now return to Ross and his confidence that the Passage ‘contains sound Aristotelian doctrine and terminology’ (p. 228 above). Ross offers no proof of this assertion, but he always had Bonitz’s commentary in front of him as he wrote, and Bonitz does offer proof. He lists parallels in other works from which, he claims, the Passage ‘cum placitis Aristotelicis optime concineret . . . appareat’. I shall take his proof texts one by one, to show that, while each feature some element also found in the Passage, none of them contains everything we find there. Most importantly, none of them contains or requires the terminological distinction between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια. Nor, to be fair, does Bonitz, unlike Ross, assert that they do.

What is at stake in this section of the enquiry is whether the distinction drawn in the Passage between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια occurs anywhere else in the corpus. If, as I shall argue, it does not, scholars should stop treating it as a central theme of Aristotle’s philosophy and stop importing it into the exposition of his other works. It is a unique, problematic intrusion into the text of the Metaphysics.

(a) We begin with one of Aristotle’s logical treatises. Ἐ prow 22 is a study of a type of fallacy which depends on the fact that linguistically similar expressions can stand for categorically different things. The example I am interested in is developed at 1789–28. You are asked, ‘Is it possible to act and to have acted on the same thing at the same time [ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμα ποιώ τε καὶ πεποιηκέναι]?’

‘No.’ ‘But it is possible surely to see and to have seen the same thing at the same time and in the same respect at the same angle [ἀλλὰ ἀλλὰ...}

100 W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, The Works of Aristotle Translated into English, 1. Topica and De sophistici enlenchis (Oxford, 1928), writes, ‘Is it possible to be doing and to have done the same thing at the same time?’, which makes τὸ αὐτὸ an internal accusative. But the follow-up question demands that it be an external accusative, as does the solution in terms of categories. Of course, the ambiguity of ποιῶ can give rise to fallacy (Plato, Ἐπιστ. 284 b-c), but that is not the sort of fallacy Aristotle wants to illustrate here. E. Poste, Aristotle on Fallacies or the Sophistici Elenchi, with a translation and notes (London, 1866), translates, ‘Can we be making and have made one and the same thing?’ (similarly Ackrill, ‘Distinction’, 123, and L.-A. Dorion’s French translation: Les Refutations sophistiques, introduction, traduction et commentaire (Paris, 1995)), but no one would be tempted to class seeing something as a case of making something, whereas Platonic accounts of vision do involve the perceiver’s acting on the object: Theaet. 153 b–154 λ; Tim. 45 b–d.
μὴν ὁρᾶν γέ τι ἄμα καὶ ἑωρακέναι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται].

You can accept that, without being refuted, provided you insist that seeing belongs in the category of undergoing (πάρχειν), not the category of action (ποιεῖν).

Now this is about the possibility of seeing and having seen, not about the necessary conjoint truth of present and perfect, but it is still interesting that the argument under discussion presupposes respondents who will find themselves inclined both to answer 'No' to the opening question and to accept the apparent counter-example. Despite the linguistic similarity between the verbs ποιεῖν and ὁρᾶν, there is a difference to which a native speaker of Greek will be sensitive, even though it may take a sophism to jolt them into thinking about it and a philosopher to provide a theory of categories which can explain it.

Aristotle provides the theory, but he writes in terms which suggest that anyone might propound the sophism in an attempt to trick their opponent. The scenario envisaged is a dialectical exchange. He treats the simultaneity of seeing and having seen as a commonplace of dialectical debate, not his own discovery.

(b) In De sensu 6, 446b2–6, Aristotle comes closer to asserting the necessary conjoint truth of present and perfect for verbs of perception:

Now, even though it is always the case that at the same time one hears a thing and has heard it, and in general perceives and has perceived,

101 'At the same angle' is a nice suggestion by Brague, Monde, 462.
102 Michael of Ephesus [alias Pseudo-Alexander], In SE 149, 29 Vallies, is explicit that it is sophists who put the questions. V. Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote: commentaire sur le quatrième livre de la Physique (10–14) et sur la Poétique (‘Goldschmidt’) (Paris, 1982), 172, agrees.
103 Brague, Monde, 462–3, agrees, as does Graham, 121. If the point is indeed a commonplace, we can reject outright the claim of A. Rijkstervel, Aristotle, Verb Meaning and Functional Grammar: Towards a New Typology of States of Affairs, with an appendix on Aristotle’s distinction between kinesis and energeia (Amsterdam, 1989), 45, that it ‘cannot possibly be seen as reflecting actual Greek usage’, in which εἰπόμενος always involves a past reference. Of course εἰπόμενος does often have past reference (Plato, Soph. 239 a 1, is a nice example signalled to me by Lesley Brown), but Chanut’s message is that the perfect evolved over time with successive forms continuing to coexist.
104 ὅπως can be taken either as the subject of the verbs (Ackrill, ‘Distinction’) or as their object. I prefer the latter, in line with n. 100 above. But either way, a universal generalization results, which can equally well be conveyed by the ‘always’ I have borrowed from Barnes’s revision of the Oxford translation. As for καὶ εἶ, it suits the context well to take it as ‘even though’, introducing an admitted fact: Denniston, 301–2.
and they [perceptions] involve no becoming, but exist [sc. when they do] without undergoing a process of coming to be, nevertheless, just as, when
the blow has been struck, the sound is not yet at the ear . . .

There is little point to this (incomplete) sentence unless Aristotle
wants to affirm the antecedent of its opening conditional ‘even though . . . nevertheless . . .’. The antecedent presents a ‘logical’ truth which might seem hard to reconcile with the evident
physical truth that sound and smell take time to travel to the per-
ceiver. It was the quantifier ‘always’ that Ackrill adduced as evi-
dence that in this text, and so also in the Passage, the form ‘at
the same time \( p \) and \( q \)’ is meant to indicate an inference from \( p \)
to \( q \), not just a conjunction. \(^{105}\) I agree, but add that the quantifier
serves even better as evidence for an inference going both ways at
once.

(c) We now move fully into physics. At \( \text{Phys. 3. 2, 201}^{b}31-3 \), we
find this:

\[ \text{ἡ τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι τις δοκεῖ, ἀπελθὲς δὲ αἴτων δὲ ἀντὶ ἄπλος τὸ}
\[ \text{δύνατον, οὐ ἔστι ἐνέργεια.} \]

Change is thought to be a sort of actuality, but an incomplete one; the
explanation is that the potential thing whose actuality it is is incomplete.

The thesis that change is a sort of actuality, but an incomplete one,
is no passing remark. It is part of Aristotle’s definition of change,
which has a foundational role in his physics. In the wider argu-
mentative context of \( \text{Physics 3. 2,} \) to deny that change is incomplete
actuality would be to reduce it to not-being, the status the Plato-
ists assign it. In effect, Aristotelian physics, which is the study of
things with an internal principle of change and stability, would have
no real subject-matter to investigate. \(^{106}\)

The thesis that change is incomplete actuality reappears in \( \text{DA}
2. 5, 417^{b}16-17 \), this time without the qualification ‘is thought to
be’ and with a back-reference to \( \text{Physics 3. 1–3,} \) as the place where
the thesis was explained (καὶ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργεια τις, ἀπελθὲς
μέντοι, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται). Another comparable text is \( \text{DA}
3. 7, 431^{b}6-7 \).

\(^{105}\) Ackrill, ‘Distinction’, 124, except that in his translation the quantifier is ‘every-
thing’ taken as subject of the verbs: ‘everything at the same time hears and has heard’.

\(^{106}\) This is one of the places where Frede, ‘Potentiality’, is especially relevant to
my discussion.
η γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ ἄτελον ἐνέργεια, ἡ δ᾿ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα, ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου.

For change is the actuality of the incomplete; actuality unqualified, the actuality of what is complete, is different.

Here Aristotle makes explicit what the other two physical texts imply, that incomplete actuality contrasts with another sort of actuality: actuality unqualified, actuality simpliciter, or, as he might equally well have said, complete actuality.

But this is still not the doctrine of the Passage. ἐνέργεια still contrasts with potentiality (as it does in the rest of Metaphysics Θ), not with κίνησις. On the contrary, κίνησις is explained as ἐνέργεια: ἐνέργεια which is incomplete. I conclude that the original home of the Passage was not a physical treatise. For its exclusive distinction between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια runs counter to a foundational thesis of Aristotelian physics. In the Passage being a κίνησις entails not being ἐνέργεια at all.

12. To say this is not to deny the Aristotelian provenance of the distinction. The Passage shows how easy it is to pass from 'x is only qualifiedly F' to 'x is not F at all, but something else'. Thus, by way of preparing for its terminological innovation, the Passage says that actions (πράξεις) which are not their own end either do not count as action, or at any rate they are not complete action (1048b21–2: οὐκ ἐστι ταῦτα πράξεις ἢ οὐ τελεια γε). In the sequel the first disjunct is chosen, with ἐνέργεια substituted for πράξεις. κίνησις, because they are incomplete, are not ἐνέργειαι at all. It is the second disjunct that prevails in the physical treatises. Yes, κίνησις are ἐνέργειαι, subject to the qualification that they are incomplete ἐνέργειαι. To motivate the terminological innovation of the Passage, we should look for a (non-physical) context where the first disjunct would be philosophically more appropriate than the second, where there are grounds for saying that a πράξις or ἐνέργεια which is not its own end is not πράξις or ἐνέργεια at all.

Which brings me, of course, to the Nicomachean Ethics and to Aristotle’s critique of the theory put forward in Plato’s Philebus that pleasure is a process of becoming (γένεσις). NE 10. 3–5 is the text most often, and most confidently, cited as parallel for the κίνησις—

107 Some editors add C’s ἢ here.
ἐνέργεια distinction in the Passage. Before tackling it, it will be helpful to review our findings so far.

Go back to Metaph. Θ 6, 1048b8–9: τὰ μὲν γάρ ὡς κίνησις πρὸς δύναμιν, τὰ δὲ ὡς οὐσία πρὸς τινα ὕλην (‘some are related as change to capacity, while others are related as substance to some matter’).

In his note ad loc. Ross writes:

At one time Aristotle includes ἐνέργεια in κίνησις (Rhet. 1412a 9); at another he includes κίνησις in ἐνέργεια (Phys. 201b 31, De An. 431a 6, E.N. 1154b 27); at another he speaks of the two as mutually exclusive (1048b 28).

κίνησις is said to be an ἐνέργεια but ἀτελής (Phys. 201b 31), or to differ from ἐνέργεια because it is ἀτελής (1048b 29). The variations of language need not disturb us. κίνησις and ἐνέργεια are species of something wider for which Aristotle has no name, and for which he uses now the name of one species, now that of the other. The difference is brought out as well in ll. 18–35 [i.e. the Passage] as anywhere in Aristotle.

It is correct that both κίνησις and ἐνέργεια have what one may call a generic use; in Section 1 above we noted generic κίνησις in Θ 6, generic ἐνέργεια in Θ 8. It is correct also that κίνησις has a specific use for processes directed towards an end-state external to themselves, as laid down in Physics 3. 1–3. Such variety should not surprise.

κίνησις and its parent verb had already had a long history in ordinary Greek. But ἐνέργεια and the associated verb ἐνέργεσθαι are first attested in Aristotle himself. Probably his invention, they start off as terms of art. Furthermore, while it is correct—I emphasized the point earlier (above, p. 222)—that at Θ 6, 1048b8–9, κίνησις is generic in that it covers both building and seeing, nowhere does Aristotle expressly divide κινήσεις into those which are their own goal and those that aim at a further product. He does so divide ἐνέργεια, as in NE 1. 1, 1094b16–17, and in Θ 8 as quoted above, but the nearest he gets to a parallel division of κίνησις is NE 10. 3, 1174b4: ‘Most κινήσεις are incomplete’ (αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς). Nor does he ever ack-

108 In dealing with book 10 I have been helped by testing discussion with David Charles.

109 Quoted with approval by Smeets, 108 n. 37, Goldschmidt, 176, and Linguisti, 59 n. 149. Contrast J. B. Skemp, ‘The Activity of Immobility’, in Auben (ed.), Études, 229–45 at 244: ‘we are all dissatisfied with the complacent remark of Ross in his note on Metaph., 1048b8 that “the variations of language need not disturb us”’.

110 At NE 7. 12, 1135b15–17, the persons who wrongly think that ἐνέργεια is γένεσις are clearly philosophers. On Aristotelian word formation, K. Von Fritz, Philosophie und sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Plato und Aristoteles (New York, Leipzig, Paris, and London 1938; repr. Darmstadt, 1960), esp. 66–9 on ἐνέργεια and ἐνεργέσθαι, is most interesting.
nowledge the idea of κίνησις unqualified, or complete κίνησις. In the philosophical language of the time that would sound bizarre.

I conclude that the generic uses of κίνησις and ἐνέργεια are not on a par. They should not be regarded as alternative extensions to the generic level of the terminology for two parallel species. Ross’s account is not only too simple. He goes wrong at the start by making the Passage his point of departure. The Passage is the only text he cites—I have been arguing it is the only text he can cite—for κίνησις and ἐνέργεια as parallel species of a wider but nameless genus. But even here he ignores two important facts. First, in the Passage the genus does have a name: πρᾶξις. Second, its subdivision into κίνησις and ἐνέργεια is presented as a terminological innovation. Ross’s procedure is methodologically back to front.

The truth is that, when Aristotle says in DA 2, 5 that κίνησις is ἐνέργεια τις, ἀτελής μέντοι (‘change is a sort of actuality, but an incomplete one’), he is not locating specific κίνησις in a wider class. ‘Change is a sort of actuality’ does not mean ‘Change is one species of actuality alongside others’, but ‘Change is an actuality of a sort, not a mere nothing’. Aristotle is reminding us of how in Physics 3. 1–3 he rescued κίνησις from the oblivion of unreality and not-being to which the Platonists would consign it. The τις in ἐνέργεια τις has an alienans function. The difference between ἡ ἀπλώς ἐνέργεια and ἐνέργεια ἀτελής is not the difference between two species of a genus (like the ἐνέργειας διαφορούσας τῷ εἰδεί at NE 10, 5, 1175’25–6), but the difference between an ἐνέργεια in the full sense of the term and one from which you cannot expect everything you would normally expect from an ἐνέργεια.

Thus the relation of specific κίνησις to generic ἐνέργεια is not a species-genus relation like that of deer to animal. Only in the Passage do κίνησις and ἐνέργεια appear as parallel species of a common genus, πρᾶξις. That requires a change in the meaning of the term ἐνέργεια, such that being an ἐνέργεια entails not being a κίνησις, which

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111 The phrase κίνησις τέλεια at NE 10, 3, 1174’28, denotes a thing you cannot find at any time prior to arrival at the (external) goal: a completed change rather than one that is intrinsically complete.
112 Contrast Proclus, much later, on τέλεια κίνησις at In Parm. 797, 32–8 Cousin. Ross’s use of the phrase in his note on Metaph. Θ 6, 1048’18–21, is illicit.
113 Similarly, in his Physics commentary (W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Physics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford, 1936)), ad 207’31–2, Ross refers to the Passage as a fuller statement of the doctrine of Physics 3. 23.
114 See Appendix 2 for an exemplary ancient explanation of this point by Iamblichus.
is enough to make it the case that, by contraposition, being a κίνησις entails not being (in the new, narrowed sense) an ἑνέργεια. To produce the exclusive contrast between κίνησις and ἑνέργεια there is no need for the term κίνησις to change meaning as well. κίνησις in the Passage keeps to the specific use it has elsewhere, for changes (active or passive) intrinsically directed at an end-state outside themselves. In that case it can still be called ἑνέργεια τίς in the Physics sense of that phrase. In view of what the Passage does with the generic term πράξις, one might say that κίνησις is now not ἑνέργεια, because it is only ἑνέργεια τίς in the old sense.

I conclude that what we should look for in the Nicomachean Ethics is evidence that the term ἑνέργεια is being used in the exclusive sense of the Passage. Then, provided κίνησις has its standard specific sense, each term will exclude the other.

13. The place to start is Aristotle’s report of the Philebus account of pleasure:

τέλειον τι τάγαθαν τιθέντες, τάς δὲ κίνησις καὶ τᾶς γένεσις ἀτελεῖς, τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν ἀποφαίνει περιώντα, οὐλ' ἄκακας λέγειν οὐλ' εἶναι κίνησιν. (NE 10. 3. 1173e29–31)

Postulating that the good is something complete, whereas changes and becomings are incomplete, they try to show that pleasure is change and becoming. But they seem to be wrong when they say this. Pleasure seems not to be change at all.

The word Plato used is γένεσις, not κίνησις.\(^{115}\) γένεσις, not κίνησις, is the word Aristotle himself uses when criticizing the Philebus theory in NE 7. 12. 1153e7–17. If the book 10 discussion brings in κίνησις as well, Aristotle must have a purpose in mind. I suggest that the purpose is to translate what Plato means by γένεσις into his own terminology.\(^{116}\)

After all, γένεσις in Aristotle standardly refers to the coming to be of a new substance, in contrast to the alteration, growth, or spatial movement of an existing substance. The Philebus announces a compendious, exclusive dichotomy between γένεσις and οὐσία, where γένεσις covers, not only the building of ships (54η), but also

\(^{115}\) So far as I know, the only place where Plato uses κίνησις of pleasure and pain themselves is Rep. 583c 9–10, where the point is to contrast them with the ἑνέργεια of the intermediate state in which one feels neither pleasure nor pain.

\(^{116}\) Cf. Top. 6. 8, 146b13–19, a curious passage where γένεσις is glossed by ἑνέργεια (broad sense).
the body’s being restored to its natural state by food and drink (54 η). When Aristotle needs a compendious noun to cover all types of change, he chooses κύνης or μεταβολή. So what more natural than to gloss Platonic γένεσις as Aristotelian κύνης? In its standard specific sense κύνης is directed towards an end-state outside itself, and this fits the Philebus characterization of γένεσις as always ‘for the sake of’ the οὐσία that results.

Problem: the Philebus understands ‘for the sake of’ in an exclusively instrumental sense. Goodness is confined to the οὐσία for the sake of which any particular γένεσις occurs (54 η−δ). Then, if pleasure is γένεσις, it is altogether excluded from the class of things that are good. If Aristotelian κύνης does duty for Platonic γένεσις, it too must be completely severed from the class of things that are good. This is not Aristotle’s normal view: the text from Metaphysics Θ 8 quoted earlier (p. 223) has it that the exercise of a capacity to build is more of an end than the capacity, although it is less of an end than the ultimate thing, the resulting house (1050’23−8). In the Philebus the activity of shipbuilding is not an end at all, because it is entirely for the sake of the resulting ship.

To see how this could lead to an exclusive contrast between κύνης and ἐνέργεια, as in the Passage, turn to the other place where the Philebus account of pleasure comes under fire, Nicomachean Ethics 7. 12.

ἐπὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡμοῦ ὀψερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· οὐ γὰρ γενέσεως εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πάσαι, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργεια καὶ τέλος. οὐδὲ γνωσμένων συμβαίνουσιν, ἀλλὰ χρωμάτων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἐτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελείαν ἀγαμένων τῆς φάσεως.

Again, it is not necessary that there should be something else better than pleasure, as some say the end is something better than becoming; for pleasures are not in fact becomings, nor even do they all accompany some becoming. On the contrary, they are actualities and themselves each an end. Nor do they occur when we are becoming something, but when we are exercising a capacity already possessed. And not all have an end distinct from themselves, only the pleasures of people who are being who are the perfection of their nature. (1153’7−12)

117 Cat. 14; Phys. 3. 1, 200’33−201’6; 5. 1, 224’35−225’20; and n. 10 above. But for a strikingly compendious use of the verb γίγνεσθαι, see Metaph. Ζ 7, 1032’13−15.

118 Cf. ὁ κύνης τὸ τέλος at 1050’17 and the comparative formulation at NE 1. 1, 1094’5−6. Remember that, besides producing a house, the exercise of the builder’s art helps to preserve it for future use (DA 2. 5, 417’3−5).

119 In studying which I have been greatly helped by discussion with Christof Rapp.
The last sentence quoted is proof that ἐνέργεια in this text does not have the exclusive sense of the Passage. It speaks of pleasurable ἐνέργεια directed towards a further, external goal, the perfecting of our nature: these will be, or at least they will include, the pleasures of learning in theoretical, ethical, or practical domains (cf. Phys. 7. 3, 246a12–b3, 247a2–3). The pleasures of learning are expressly mentioned at 1153a22–3; the pleasures of κίνησις more generally feature in the next chapter, alongside those of ἔξεις, at 1154a13–15. In Phys. 3. 1–3 learning was both κίνησις and thereby ἀτελής ἐνέργεια, and so it must be here if, however delightful in itself, it is an ἐνέργεια in pursuit of an external goal. But in the Passage learning is a paradigm example of κίνησις as opposed to ἐνέργεια. QED. More on the pleasures of learning and progress below.

Meanwhile, pursuing his polemic with Plato Aristotle here puts γένεσις and ἐνέργεια in exclusive contrast, as again at 1153a15–17, although the penultimate sentence in the quotation just given (οδη ... χρωμένων) implies that ἐνέργεια retains its standard contrast with δύναμις or ἔξεις (cf. 1153a24–5). Still, once γένεσις is glossed as κίνησις, which does not happen in the book 7 discussion, we might expect a corresponding exclusive contrast between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια.

Many scholars find that expectation fulfilled in book 10, where γένεσις is indeed glossed as κίνησις (10. 3, quoted above; cf. 4, 1174b10 and 13) in the initial statement of the Philebus theory. But so far as I can see, the critique that follows nowhere forces us to abandon Aristotle’s usual understanding of κίνησις and ἐνέργεια. He does not take up the opportunity to make ἐνέργεια incompatible with κίνησις. Let me track through the arguments one by one.

(a) 10. 3, 1173b32–b4: It is a feature of all κίνησις that it can be qualified by the adverbs ‘quickly’ and ‘slowly’. We can walk quickly or slowly, but we cannot enjoy something quickly or slowly. True enough, and an effective argument against the Philebus account of pleasure as κίνησις. But since the term ἐνέργεια does not occur, the argument cannot help our enquiry.

The next argument (1173b4–7) is couched in terms of γένεσις, not κίνησις. In the string of arguments that rounds off the chapter

120 Ackrill, ‘Distinction’, set the pattern and many followed suit. A rare sign of caution is D. Bostock, ‘Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle’s Ethics’ [‘Bostock’], Phronesis, 33 (1988), 251–72 at 260–1: NE 10 argues ‘at least roughly’ along the same lines of thought as the Passage.
γένεσις comes up once more (1173b19), κίνησις not at all. κίνησις does not return until 10. 4.

(b) 10. 4, 1174a14–17: all κίνησις takes time to reach its form and completion, whereas pleasure, like seeing, is complete at any moment. Aristotle does not say that κίνησις is incomplete ἐνέργεια, but he insists that it is incomplete (1174b22, 27–8, 4), and he refers us elsewhere for an accurate, scientific account of κίνησις (1174b2–3).

If, as some think, the reference is to Physics 5. 1–4, note this remark at 5. 1, 224b10: 'We have defined κίνησις previously', which presupposes 3. 1–3. So the term κίνησις retains its standard specific sense, as defined in those crucial chapters. Other scholars (beginning with Michael of Ephesus, In EN 10. 4, 552. 17 Heybut) suppose the reference is to Physics 6–8, but this changes nothing since 8. 1, 251b8–10, also draws on 3. 1–3. As for ἐνέργεια, it simply does not occur in the lines we are discussing. Once more, the enquiry draws a blank.

Some may protest that even if the word ἐνέργεια does not occur, Aristotle is presupposing the narrow use defined in the Passage when he contrasts the idea that pleasure is κίνησις or γένεσις with his own view that it is a whole and wholly present at every instant (1174b17–19, 5). I reply that what this contrast shows is that Aristotle can make his point in other words, without calling on the term ἐνέργεια in either the broad or the narrow sense. To say that pleasure does not require a stretch of time, because it is a complete whole in the present now, is enough to refute the claim that pleasure is γένεσις or κίνησις, which do require a stretch of time, but it does not impose the narrow meaning of the Passage on the word ἐνέργεια for the simple reason (to repeat) that that word is neither used nor mentioned.

(c) 10. 4, 1174b14–17, launching Aristotle’s own account of pleasure, does use ἐνέργεια, but qualifies it as τελεία, which would be redundant if the term had the narrow sense defined in the Passage:

αισθήσις δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητόν ἐνέργειάτης, τελείως δὲ τὴς εὐ διακειμένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἰσθήσιν (τουοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια . . . . .

Since every sense is active in relation to its object, and a sense which is

111 Liske, after acknowledging (p. 161) that the Passage is the sole explicit presentation of the distinction, goes on to describe NE 10. 4 as the text where Aristoteles die κίνησις–ἐνέργεια–Unterscheidung zwar nicht explizit thematisiert, aber doch die genauste Charakterisierung von ihr gibt, die sich in seinem Werk findet’ (p. 166).
in good condition acts completely in relation to the most beautiful of its objects (for complete activity seems to be especially of this nature . . .) . . .
(trans. Ross–Urmson)

Even those like myself who would prefer to translate τελεία ἐνέργεια here as 'perfect activity' should acknowledge that Aristotle begins in a way which positively discourages taking ἐνέργεια in the narrow meaning of the Passage. Compare τελειοτάτη ἐνέργεια at 1074'20 and 22.

(d) From 10. 4, 1174'14, to the end of 10. 5 Aristotle expounds his own theory that pleasure completes an ἐνέργεια as a supervenient end. Since he states that there is no pleasure without ἐνέργεια (1175'20–1), it is not surprising that the words ἐνέργεια and ἐνεργεῖν occur again and again. The main examples often remind scholars of the Passage: perceiving, thinking, contemplating, living.¹²² But there is nothing to show that ἐνέργεια is being used in the exclusive sense defined in the Passage, and at least one of Aristotle's examples should give us pause. This is 10. 5, 1175'30–5:

The pleasure proper to a given ἐνέργεια helps it forward. For those who enjoy that ἐνέργεια do it with more discernment and with greater accuracy. Thus those who are fond of geometry become proficient in it, and grasp its problems better, and similarly those who are fond of music or of building or of other arts make progress towards their proper function ἐνεργεῖν eἰς τὸ ὀικεῖον ἰόγαν, because they enjoy it.¹¹³

Building, as we have seen, is a standard example of incomplete ἐνέργεια. What are these lovers of building (φιλοκοδόμοι) doing here if Aristotle means to confine ἐνέργεια to the restrictive meaning

¹²² So, influentially, Ackrill, 'Distinction', 128: 'Aristotle does not say that he is here talking of the distinction between energeia and kinesis. But he likens pleasure or enjoyment (ἡδονή) to seeing, and contrasts both with kinesis, using as examples of kinesis house-building and walking—which were also used as examples of kineses in the Metaphysics passage. Both the choice of examples and the general account of the contrast leave no doubt that it is the energeia–kinesis distinction that he is using.' As if building and (if not walking) rolling and jumping were not both κωφής and ἀνελθεῖσι ἐνεργεῖαι in the Physics (3. 7, 203'16–19, 8–13). As if 9. 8 (quoted above) does not contrast seeing with building while counting both as ἐνεργεῖαι. Only Croese, 122 n. 3, has the grace to say that she accepts Ackrill's conclusion because 'To our knowledge this claim has not been questioned.' Others just follow suit, although I. M. Crombie, in his review of Bambrough (ed.), New Essays, in Classical Review, NS 17 (1967), 30–3 at 32, was an early dissenting voice, spot on: '[Ackrill] says that Aristotle "classifies enjoying on the energeia side of the energeia–kinesis distinction". But what Aristotle says is simply that enjoying is not a κάνονας.'

of the Passage? Sophisticated answers have been offered, to the effect that a κίνησις such as building may be looked upon as an ἐνέργεια in so far as at each and every moment the builder can be said to exercise, and to have exercised, the art of building. But in the absence of any positive indication that in book 10 ἐνέργεια and κίνησις exclude each other, it seems better to suppose they do not. We then have to admit that the Passage is the sole place in the corpus where Aristotle’s now famous distinction between κίνησις and ἐνέργεια can be found.

And it is not just lovers of building who make difficulty for the view I am opposing. All the people in this text are learners. The ἐνέργεια helped forward by their keen enjoyment is that of learning some knowledge or skill, not the exercise of finished expertise. Certainly one learns to build by building, though not in the fully skilled way a qualified craftsman does. But this is a point made in Metaph. Θ 8, 1049b29–1050a3, in the very chapter I quoted earlier to illustrate the generic use of ἐνέργεια, which covers both seeing and building. There Aristotle suggests that a practising apprentice must at each stage have acquired, and be exercising, some part of the body of knowledge (1050a: τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης) they are learning. So we have two options for what it is that the lovers of building enjoy. It is either (i) the (active) exercise of partial productive knowledge or (ii) the (passive) process of acquiring more and more of the full body of knowledge. The two are compatible, even extensionally the same, and could each be highly enjoyable. Both are intrinsically directed towards a product or end-state outside themselves. According to Θ 8, (i) is an ἐνέργεια directed at a further product; according to Physics 3.1–3, (ii) is an incomplete ἐνέργεια. The Passage would say

124 Another example most naturally taken as incomplete is writing (10.5, 1175b19).
126 Owen, 147 and 150, agrees, while being equally confident (cf. 139) that in book 7 (which Ackrill, ‘Distinction’, does not discuss) ἐνέργεια does carry the exclusive sense of the Passage; Owen’s book 7 claim was refuted earlier, p. 267.
that both are κίνης, not ἐνέργεια at all. But nothing in Nicomachean Ethics 10. 5 requires, or even hints, that we should understand ἐνέργεια in the exclusive sense of the Passage. Nothing requires, or even hints, that we should understand Aristotle’s theory of pleasure to exclude the possibility of enjoying those ἐνέργειαι (generic) which are κινήσεις (specific) as well as those which are their own goal.\footnote{Here I agree with Waterlow, 187 n. 19, and Owen, 151, against e.g. Bostock, 260.} What he insists on is that pleasure is complete at every moment, from which it hardly follows that the activity enjoyed must itself be complete at every moment. Every child knows that making things is fun. A crossword puzzle offers adult pleasures—until you have completed it! Why shouldn’t a keen apprentice delight in each and every moment of the process of slowly carving out the flutes of a column? Aristotle is undoubtedly right to say that their enjoyment will hone their skill.

This last point is worth dwelling on. A very good reason to avoid reading the narrow Passage meaning of ἐνέργεια into NE 10. 3–5 is that it would saddle the work with a monstrously distorted account of what we can enjoy. It would also make those chapters clash, not only with 7. 12, 11537–12, discussed above, but also with 7. 14, 1154\textsuperscript{b}26–8:

\[\ldots\text{God always enjoys a single and simple pleasure; for there is not only an activity of movement [κινήσεως ἐνέργεια] but an activity of immobility [ἐνέργεια ἀκινησία], and pleasure is found more in rest than in movement [μάλλον ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν κινήσει]. (trans. Ross, emphasis added)\]

Which surely implies that there can be pleasure in κίνης, even if it is less, or less satisfying, than pleasure in rest or pleasure in action undertaken for its own sake.\footnote{Compare Michael of Ephesus, In EN 10, 555. 20–9 Heylbut, for the view that τέλεια ἐνέργεια are the most pleasurable, but ἀτελεῖς ἐνέργειαι can be pleasurable too.} I propose, therefore, that in 10. 3–5 ἐνέργεια has the same generic meaning as it has in NE 1. 1 and Metaphysics 8, not the narrowed meaning of the Passage.

\[(e)\text{ For confirmation, read on to the end of book 10. Aristotle twice insists that happiness involves ἐνέργειαι from which no further end is sought beside the ἐνέργεια itself (10. 6, 1176\textsuperscript{35}–7; 7, 1177\textsuperscript{1}–26). In both cases the context makes it clear that this is a substantive requirement, not a mere tautological expansion of (in the terminology of the Passage) ‘Happiness involves ἐνέργειαι’.}\]
Finally, *DA* 2. 5 again. I have already quoted from it the statement that change is incomplete actuality (417*16*). The chapter proceeds to make distinctions ‘concerning potentiality and actuality’ (417*21*: διαμετέρετον δὲ καὶ περί δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελεχείας), but none of the distinctions involves withdrawing the statement that change is incomplete actuality. The main distinction put before us is the one that tradition knows as the distinction between first and second potentiality, a distinction entirely absent from the Passage. Conversely, throughout *DA* 2. 5 actuality contrasts with δύναμις, not with κίνησις. Ackrill was right when he denied that the *De anima* has any truck with the κίνησις–ἐνέργεια distinction as presented in *Metaphysics* θ 6.\(^{110}\)

None the less, there are two very interesting disjunctions in *DA* 2. 5 which can illuminate the disjunction at θ 6, 1048\(\)21, ‘either these are not action [πράξεως], or at any rate they are not complete action’. About the θ 6 disjunction I said that it would depend on the context of enquiry which disjunct was appropriate. The same is true, I believe, of *DA* 2. 5, 417\(\)6–7, ‘[the transition to exercising knowledge] is either not alteration or it is a different kind of alteration’, and 417\(\)b13–15, ‘[learning] is either not to be described as being affected or there are two kinds of alteration’. In the case of the transition to exercising knowledge, Aristotle immediately opts for the first alternative: not alteration at all (417\(\)8–9). And this despite the fact that the transition to exercising knowledge serves him as a model for the transition to perceiving, which he insists on continuing to call alteration (417\(\)c29–418\(\)d3). Learning, on the other hand, the acquisition of knowledge as opposed to

\(^{119}\) This blocks an argument to the effect that the account in *Metaph. A* 7 and 9 of God’s changeless activity of contemplation and its enjoyment ‘provides us with Aristotle’s philosophical motivation’ for the distinction drawn in the Passage (C. Kahn, ‘On the Intended Interpretation of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*’, in J. Wiesner (ed.), *Aristotle: Werk und Wirkung* (2 vols.; Berlin and New York, 1985–7), 1. *Aristoteles und seine Schule*, 311–38 at 333). The claim is premised on the assumption that *NE* 10 treats both pleasure and contemplation as ἐνέργεια in the narrow sense of the Passage. God is indeed changeless, but in *A* as in θ 8 ἐνέργεια contrasts with δύναμις, not with κίνησις.

\(^{110}\) Ackrill, ‘Distinction’, 140–1, endorsed by M. F. Burnyeat, ‘*De anima* 2. 5’ [*De anima*], *Phronesis*, 47 (2002), 1–90 at 49 n. 56. Contrast the free use made of the Passage for the elucidation of *DA* 2. 5 by Kosman, ‘Substance’, and others too many to list.
its use, he continues to treat as a special type of alteration, even while acknowledging the legitimacy of a perspective from which it too is not alteration. I have argued elsewhere that his motive for treating perception and intellectual learning as special types of alteration, different from the alteration by which fire heats the surrounding air, is to keep some (but not all) psychology within the scope of Aristotelian physics, which is defined as the study of things that have an internal principle of change and stability. That enables him to use the analysis of alteration worked out in the Physics and De generatione et corruptione 1, and now refined in De anima 2.5, to explain the cognitive accuracy of both perception and intellectual learning. If perception and intellectual learning did not fall within Aristotelian physics, this project would abort.

If that is correct, it confirms, I submit, my earlier claim that it cannot have been in a physical context that Aristotle opted to say that change is not actuality at all. The most likely context is ethical, and more specifically a critique of the account of pleasure in Plato’s Philebus. Earlier it transpired that, contrary to standard expectations, NE 7 gets closer to the restrictive language of the Passage than NE 10. But book 7 still does not quite make it. That leaves the lost works. We should look for a suitable catalogue in the ancient catalogues of Aristotle’s numerous writings.

14. Diogenes Laerius twice lists a one-book work On Pleasure (Περὶ ἡδονῆς). The first such title keeps company with a number of Aristotle’s dialogues. The Passage is hardly in the polished prose for which the dialogues were known. The second, however, goes with a group of works that one would classify as ‘logical’: Περὶ ἡδονῆς α’ or, more probably, Περὶ ἡδονῆς προτάσεις α’. Nothing but the title is known of it, yet it is just possible that one fragment survives:

καὶ περὶ ἡδονῆς δ’ εἶρηται ποιῶν τι καὶ πῶς λέγοντο, καὶ ὅτι τὰ τε ἁπλῶς ἡδέα καὶ καλά καὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἀμαθή ἡδέα. οὐ γίνεται δὲ ἡδονὴ μὴ ἐν πράξει διὰ τούτο ὁ ἀληθῶς εὐδαιμόνιος καὶ ἠθικῶς ζήσει, καὶ τούτο οὐ μάτην οἱ ἀνθρωποὶ ἀξίοντε.

Concerning pleasure, too, it has been said what sort of thing it is and how it is a good, and that the things pleasant without qualification are also fine,

131 Burney, ‘De anima’.
132 D.I. 5.22 and 24; cf. Hesych. no. 15; Ptolemy el-Garib no. 17.
and the things good without qualification are pleasant. But pleasure does not occur except in action; for that reason, the truly happy man will also live most pleasantly, and it is not vainly that people believe this. (EE 8. 3, 1249’17–21; trans. Woods)

This fragment does not fit into its wider context. It concludes a discussion (‘Concerning pleasure, too, it has been said . . .’) which is not in fact to be found earlier in the chapter, with the result that we have been given no means of understanding ‘for that reason’.114 But we are clearly in the presence of an Aristotle who in some ethical context wants to connect pleasure, πράξις, and happiness.

Nor is Aristotle alone in having written a monograph On Pleasure. So too, apparently, did Speusippus (D.L. 4. 4: one book), Xenocrates (D.L. 4. 12: two books), Heracleides Ponticus (Athen. 512 A), Strato (D.L. 5. 59), and Theophrastus, who is credited (D.L. 5. 44) with one book Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης (On Pleasure according to Aristotle or On Pleasure in the Style of Aristotle)115 plus another entitled simply On Pleasure,116 and—last, but would that we had it!—On False Pleasure (D.L. 5. 46: one book). It would seem that the Philebus, like Plato’s Lecture on the Good, aroused a furor of discussion.

Ethics, however, is not the only branch of philosophy which the Aristotelian scheme of things kept apart from physics. Another is theology or first philosophy. David Sedley has urged me to consider this intriguing fragment:

ἀπαθὴς γὰρ ὁ νοῦς, φησὶν ὁ Θεοφράστος, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἄλλως ἢ τὸ παθητικόν, οὔτως ὡς τὸ κατηκτικὸν (ἀτελὴς γὰρ ἡ κίνησις), ἀλλὰ ὡς ἔνεργεια. ταῦτα δὲ διαφέρει, χρῆσθαι δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνοτίε τοῖς αὐτῶι δόμαιν ἢ . . . (Thiphr. fr. 307τ FHS&G)

‘For nous is unaffected’, Theophrastus says, ‘unless of course “capable of being affected” has a different sense: not “capable of being changed” (for


115 For the idiom, compare Aristotle’s Πολιτικῆς ἀκροάσεως ὡς ἢ Θεοφράστου α’ β’ γ’ δ’ ε’ σ’ τ’ η’ (D.L. 5. 24) and the (hardly enlightening) commentary of Moraux, 95–6 with n. 3.

116 R. Bodeux, Aristote: [Catégories], texte établi et traduit (Paris, 2001), pp. cv–cvii, proposes (i) that these two Theophrastus titles are identical with Aristotle’s two Περὶ θησιῶν titles, while (ii) the absence of a Politics in the list of Theophrastus titles to correspond to Θεοφράστου in my preceding note suggests hesitation over the authorship of a single 8-book Politics. The first proposal is less likely than the second, given that Theophrastus did not write dialogues.
change is incomplete), but “energeia”. These are different, but sometimes it is necessary to use the same names . . . .

Could Theophrastus be suggesting that all would be clear if we used the language of the Passage when speaking about νοῖς, giving ἐνεργεία its exclusive sense? In which case, we might propose his crisp, Aristotelian style (which includes frequent use of the first-person verb ἕλγω) as a possible originator for the Passage itself.

I think not. The quoted fragment is still in the field of physics, more specifically in the triple scheme of De anima 2. 5 and its careful, qualified extension to νοῖς in 3. 4, especially 420b13–18.137 Aristotle wants to say that the intellect’s taking on an intelligible form is not a change so much as the fulfilment of its nature, the actualization of the inherent potentiality for knowledge which he counts as part of our biological make-up, our matter (2. 5, 417b22–8). The qualification is necessary because he too, just like Theophrastus at the end of the quoted fragment, considers it necessary to go on using the language of change when speaking of the intellect (417b28–418a3). The intellect’s taking on of form is a change or, if you prefer, a switch to first actuality, not second. Second actuality is the using of what one has learnt.138

15. Now look at Jaeger’s apparatus criticus to the last sentence of Γ. In Α the sentence is followed by a doublet of the first three words of Δ. The same thing happens at the transition from Ε to Ζ and from Ι to Κ. Again, Ross records that in Α the end of Η duplicates the first words of Θ. Ambr. F 113 sup. (M) shows the same phenomenon at the end both of Γ and of Η.139 Such ‘reclamante’, as they are called, or (less correctly) ‘custodes’, are designed to help readers identify with confidence which papyrus roll comes next in the edition they are studying. Evidently, each roll contained two books. Α also shows traces of uncial stichometric numerals. The β tradition must

137 On this point I am in agreement with P. Huby, Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, Commentary vol. iv. Psychology (Texts 265–327), with contributions on the Arabic material by D. Gutas (Leiden, Boston, and Cologne, 1999), 124–5.


go back to a papyrus edition from pre-codex days,\textsuperscript{140} when lots of Aristotle was available. The Passage could have begun as a marginal annotation quite early.

But the marginal annotation hypothesis is no less compatible with a codex edition. For at least some of Aristotle’s lost works survived into late antiquity. In the fifth and sixth centuries AD we find Damascius reporting from Aristotle’s three-book treatise on the philosophy of Archytas,\textsuperscript{141} Simplicius quoting verbatim from Aristotle’s \textit{On Democritus} and his Epitome of the \textit{Timaeus}.\textsuperscript{142} Harlinger’s stemma shows the $\alpha$ and the $\beta$ traditions of the \textit{Metaphysics} starting independently, in the ninth century, the period when masses of ancient literature were lost as crucial choices were made about which uncial manuscripts should be transcribed into the new minuscule script. Often, the transcription would be made from a single uncial manuscript which was then discarded.\textsuperscript{143} The corruption of $\dot{\alpha} \mu \alpha$ to the nonsense-making $\dot{\alpha} \lambda \lambda$ at 148$^b$23 and 25 (common to $\Lambda^b$, $M$, and $C$) would have happened in an uncial manuscript: $\Lambda \alpha \alpha \lambda \lambda$ can be mistaken for $\Lambda \Lambda \Lambda \lambda$ much more easily than $\alpha \mu \alpha$ for $\alpha \lambda \lambda$.\textsuperscript{144} We can safely conclude that the Passage was already present in the hyparchetype $\beta$ itself.

The question I must now present for answer is this: How many copies of the \textit{Metaphysics} circulating in antiquity would have had the Passage? How typical, in other words, was the $\beta$ tradition? My failure to find a single ancient author who knows the Passage may be just that, my failure; my search was very far from exhaustive. Yet it is telling that scholars as widely read as Philoponus and Simplicius (see Appendix 2) remain ignorant of its existence, as do the medieval Arabic and Latin traditions.

A more important lesson to learn from this investigation is that present-day scholarship should stop citing the Passage as a source of standard Aristotelian doctrine. It is a freak performance.

\textsuperscript{140} As Christ was the first to note. See now Harlinger, 29.
\textsuperscript{141} Damasc. Pr. 306 (ii. 172. 26 Ruelle) = Arist. fr. 207 Rose\textsuperscript{1}. For the title, see D.L. 5. 25.
\textsuperscript{142} \textit{In De caelo} 294. 33–295. 22 Heiberg = Arist. fr. 208; 296. 16–18 (cf. 379. 12–17) = Arist. fr. 206. For the titles, see D.L. 5. 25 and 27.
\textsuperscript{144} So Jaeger: ‘idem error est frequens in script. uncial’.
Postscript on Michael of Ephesus

16. Volumes 19–20 of the Berlin Academy Commentaria in Aristotle Graeca contain the surviving paraphrases of, and commentaries on, the Nicomachean Ethics. Look up the passages that deal with Aristotle’s discussion of pleasure in NE 7 or 10. In volume 19 no one has anything of interest to say, and there is a total absence of echoes from the Passage in Metaphysics Θ 6. They simply talk of ἐνέργειαι as either τέλειαι or ἀτέλειαι. The same is true of volume 20 until one reaches the last commentary, by Michael of Ephesus. Suddenly, the overall intellectual quality improves and—lo and behold—at 543. 22 Heybut, commenting on NE 10. 2, he writes οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ γένεσις, ἀλλὰ ἐνέργεια . . . ἀ’ ἐνέργεια τέλη εἰσὶν ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀδοὶ πρὸς τέλη. The subject he is speaking of is pleasure. What follows is this:

ὅτι δὲ τέλος ἐστὶν ἡδονή καὶ οὐχί γένεσις, μάθομεν ἢ ἡθοποιόν. ἔτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν γενέσεων οὐχ ἀμα γίνεται τι καὶ ἐστιν ὅτε γίνεται. οὐ γὰρ ἀμα γίνεται σάρξ καὶ σάρξ ἐστιν ὅτε γίνεται, οὐδὲ ὅτε γίνεται ἡ οἰκία τότε ὅτε γίνεται καὶ ἐστιν. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐνέργειων, οἷον τοῦ ὀρατού, ἀμα τὸ ὀρατό καὶ ὁραμακέ αὐτό ὅτι τῶν ἡθονίων ἀμα τὸ ἡθοποιόν καὶ ὁραμακέ, ὅτε ἐνέργεια ἐστιν καὶ οὐ γένεσις. ἢ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ τέλος ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὀδὸς τις καὶ μεταβολὴ πρὸς τέλος. (In EN 543. 22–30 Heybut)

That pleasure is an end and not a becoming, we may learn from the following. In the case of becomings, it is not the case that something is at the same time both becoming (something) and already being (that something) while becoming it. For it is not the case that, at one and the same time when flesh is coming to be, it both is flesh and is coming to be flesh, nor that when a house is coming to be, at the same time as it is coming to be a house it also is a house. But in the case of actualities like seeing, at the same time one sees and has seen. So too with pleasures; at the same time one enjoys (something) and has enjoyed (it), so that pleasure is an

165 This sentence and the next look to be indebted to Alexander’s commentary on the De sensu passage which I quoted in sect. 11(b) above: Alex. In De sensu 125. 3–9 Wendland.
166 Translation problem: ἡθοποιόν is aorist, not perfect. As Owen, 150, remarked, the verb ἡθοποιέω ‘had no known perfect tense’. Answer: at In SE 149. 31–2 Wallies, while commenting on the passage of Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi discussed above, pp. 259–60, Michael explicitly casts ἡθοποιέω as past tense, doubtless because that was what by his day the perfect had become (E. Mihevc, ‘La disparition du parfait dans le grec de la basse époque’, Razprave Slovenska akademije znanosti in umetnosti, rassezila filološke in literarne vede, 5 (1959), 93–154 at 120–30; cf. n. 103 above. Compare the way Plotinus, Enn. 1 [42]. 16. 13–14 (from the part of this treatise
This is almost a Rückübersetzung into Byzantine Greek of Ackrill on the same Aristotelian text, with both construing the perfect as a tense with past reference. Neither Ackrill nor Michael found the equivalence of present and perfect in the NE passage they were commenting on. As we have seen, the equivalence is noticed in the Sophistici elenchi and the De sensu as well as Θ 6, but only Θ 6 uses it as a criterion for being an ἀνεργεια in the special narrowed sense that Michael is temporarily using here.¹⁴⁷ There can be little doubt that Michael knows the Passage. He is indeed the sole ancient or medieval writer I have been able to find who clearly reveals that he does know it.¹⁴⁸ But we also saw that Michael, alias Pseudo-Alexander, did not read the Passage in the Metaphysics when composing his commentary on that work. He knows it, but not from the Metaphysics; or at least, not from the manuscript he used when writing his Metaphysics commentary. He must have read it, or a text making the same or a similar point, somewhere else.

A couple of comments on Michael’s methods of work are pertinent here:

Michael . . . was remarkable among Byzantine scholars for the scope of his interests. He commented on Aristotelian works which were all but ignored by other commentators as well as on those which were studied traditionally.¹⁴⁹

. . . Michael vacuumed old manuscripts to find notes for his Elenchi commentary. Indeed his whole method of work consisted in gathering whatever ancient materials he could lay hands on, putting them together, mending them and supplementing them, so as to produce something that could be discussed in Appendix 2 below), puts κακῶς parallel to ἀνεργεια, a verb which also has a normally formed perfect.

¹⁴⁷ I say ‘temporarily’ because already at 545. 7 Heylbut, after the very next lemma, he has gone back to the normal broad use of ἀνεργεια, which continues in the sequel: see esp. 545. 30–30, 562. 34–6, 568. 35–569. 2 Heylbut.

¹⁴⁸ No sign of the Passage in, for example, Alexander’s Ethical Questions, despite his having plenty to say about pleasure. Appendix 2 below casts doubt on the common view that the Passage was known in Neoplatonist circles.

a companion to a whole work by Aristotle. He put together commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* in this way too.\textsuperscript{150}

Even if in the libraries of twelfth-century Constantinople he is rather unlikely to have come across an old uncial manuscript containing Aristotle’s *Περὶ ἡδονῆς*, Michael could well have read a report of its exclusive distinction between ἐνέργεια and κίνησις. More must have happened than that one day he stumbled upon a *Metaphysics* manuscript from the β tradition which did contain the Passage, for his remarks contain material (e.g. about the coming to be and being of flesh and house) which do not echo either the Passage or the *Nicomachean* chapter he is commenting upon.\textsuperscript{151} The one thing we may be sure of is that he would not have used such material unless he had reason to believe it represented, directly or indirectly, the Philosopher’s thoughts.

My argument has not tried to deny that they are the Philosopher’s thoughts. Only to affirm that they derive from some very, very special context about which we can only speculate.

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\section*{APPENDIX 1}

The Passage in M and C

The collation was kindly carried out by Christian Brockman, using Jaeger’s OCT as the work of reference. All differences from this edition are noted, except missing accents and differences in the use of accents in connection with enclitics; there is no iota subscript in either manuscript.

\begin{itemize}
\item **M (Ambr. F 113 sup.)**
\item 1048\textsuperscript{r}19-20 οἶνος τοῦ ἰσχυντοῦ ἢ ἰσχυναία αὐτῷ:
\begin{quote}
The words occur in the last line of fo. 151\textsuperscript{r}. The page turns after ἰσχυναία. Later, in 1048\textsuperscript{r}20, the scribe writes ἰσχυναία and not ἰσχυναία.
\end{quote}
\item 1048\textsuperscript{r}20 δ’ ἄταν
\item 1048\textsuperscript{r}22 ἐκεῖνη ἐνυπάρχει
\item 1048\textsuperscript{r}23-4 καὶ ἡ σφαξία: οἶνος ὀρᾶ· ἄλλα καὶ φρονεῖ καὶ νοεῖ
\item 1048\textsuperscript{r}25 ἄλλα instead of ἂμα
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{151} Cf. n. 145 above.
M. F. Burnyeat

It seems that he writes ὀδοῦδαίσει, but the sigma is not clearly visible on the photograph.

The manuscript has καὶ καὶ καὶ κεκάνηκεν

C (Taur. B VII 23)

Between ἡ πρᾶξις and ἦ there might something, but the photograph does not permit precise determination of whether there really is something meaningful and what it is.

In the margin varia lectio, but the margin is damaged. The sign (two dots) seems to refer back to ὅρα.

First line of the note: γρ(άφεται) and the beginning of a word, three letters more or less visible: καλ (?) Second line of the note: φρονεῖ (it seems)

A number of C’s unusual readings (ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ; ἦ before πρᾶξις; omission of ἀλλ’ αὐ; καὶ νενοηµένα µανθάνει as an independent sentence) are shared by N and by the fifteenth-century hand (very similar to Bessarion’s) which has written the Passage into the margin of E (twelfth century). Bessarion owned E as well as D, which has the Passage, plus three more Metaphysics manuscripts: H, f, and Q.
APPENDIX 2

Did Plotinus, Enneads 6. 1 [42], 15–22, start a debate about the Passage?

Enneads 6. 1. 16 opens an interesting critique of Aristotle’s definition of κίνησις as ἐνέργεια ἀτελής. There is no doubt that Plotinus has Physics 3. 1–3 in mind, since he starts with an abbreviated quotation of the definition at Physics 3. 2, 31–2.112 Where Aristotle writes:

η τε κίνησις ἐνέργεια μὲν εἶναι τις δοκεῖ, ἀτελής δὲ οὗ ἐστιν ἐνέργεια.

Change is thought to be an actuality of a sort, though incomplete, because the potential thing whose actuality it is is incomplete,

Plotinus rehearsed no more than this:

εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι τὴν κίνησιν ἀτελὴ ἐνέργειαν εἶναι . . .

If someone were to say that change is incomplete actuality . . .

Whether deliberately or because he is quoting from memory, he omits Aristotle’s explanation of just why the actuality which change is is an incomplete actuality. He proceeds, as will emerge shortly, to substitute a quite different account of his own.

The critique of Aristotle’s definition which then follows elicited comments and replies from Porphyry, Iamblichus, and finally Simplicius, who wrote up the debate in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 303. 32 fl. Kalbfleisch. An impressive body of modern literature treats this many-sided encounter as a debate about the Passage as well as about Physics 3. 1–3. Both Croese chapter 4 and Chiaradonna chapter 2 are such contributions, as is Natali, ‘La critica’, which I recommend as a helpful guide for reading through Plotinus’ text.113 I shall argue that, on the contrary, no contestant in this ancient discussion reveals knowledge of the Passage. Since one or another of them would probably have mentioned it had they

112 The definition is repeated at DA 2. 5, 417”16–17, without further explanation, just a back-reference to Physics 3. 2.

113 C. Natali, ‘La critica di Plotino ai concetti di attualità e movimento in Aristotele’, in C. Natali and S. Maso (eds.), Antiaristotelismo (Amsterdam, 1999), 211–29. The only justification I have found offered for coupling the Passage with Physics 3. 1–3 in discussion of the debate between Plotinus and his critics is Croese, 122: ‘The way in which motion is described in the two passages shows that Aristotle has in mind more or less the same concept as in the Physics’ (emphasis added). E. Emilson’s recent Plotinus on Intellect (Oxford, 2007), 56, is properly cautious about bringing in the Passage.
been aware of its existence, the debate is evidence that the Passage remained as little known in antiquity as it is in our manuscript tradition.

To put the issue in a nutshell: in annotating *Enneads* 6. 1. 16 Henry-Schwyzer cite the Passage alongside *Physics* 3, Armstrong mentions only the latter. I shall argue (as promised above, p. 237 n. 46) that Armstrong’s choice was the canny one. The double tradition displayed by Harlfinger’s *stemma codicum* guarantees that not all ancient readers of the *Metaphysics* would find the Passage in the copy before them. The Arabic and Latin translators clearly did not. The burden of proof must now be on anyone who maintains that Plotinus or his critics did know the Passage. Meanwhile, congratulations to Gwenäëlle Aubry for writing a considerable book on δύναµις and ἐνέργεια in Aristotle and Plotinus¹⁵⁴ which mentions the Passage only once—to set it aside. *Ab esse ad posse valet consequentia.*

Plotinus starts out by treating ‘Change is incomplete actuality’ as a straightforward definition *per genus et differentiam*, the genus being ἐνέργεια and ἀτελῆς the differentia. The immediate result is that incompleteness becomes a straightforward attribute of the ἐνέργεια which is κύνηγας and Plotinus can argue, against Aristotle as thus construed, that walking, for example, is walking, in the completest possible sense, from the walker’s very first steps. What remains incomplete after a step or two is not the walker’s walking, but his walking a certain distance (16. 5–12).

True, but the purported criticism of Aristotle’s definition is in fact an elucidation of the point Aristotle is making when he grounds the incompleteness of the walking on incompleteness as an attribute of the walker (ῥ ὁ ὁδοτῶν). The walking, for Aristotle, is the actuality of the walker’s potential to be in another place (not a potential to walk). Accordingly, it remains an incomplete actuality throughout the period of a walker’s walking right up to their arrival at the place they have the potential to be in.¹⁵⁵

I conclude that, as so often, two great minds are talking past each other. Aristotle does not deny what Plotinus affirms, that walking is walking all along, from the start, or that κύνηγας is already ἐνέργεια, already therefore actual κύνηγας, before it reaches its goal. On the contrary, ἀτελῆς expresses what sort of ἐνέργεια it has been (actually) all along, namely, one that manifests and seeks to realize the walker’s potentiality for being at a certain place (which may never be reached).

Since the very concept of κύνηγας as ἀτελῆς ἐνέργεια is excluded by the Passage, Plotinus is most unlikely to have the Passage in view. His subsequent


¹⁵⁵ For clear elucidation of this point, see the now classic article Kosman, ‘Motion’.
argument (16. 14–39) that ἐνέργεια is no more ‘in timelessness’ (ἐν ἀχρόνῳ) than κίνησις is expressly indexed to Phys. 1. 3, 186'15–16 (cf. 8. 3, 253'25; Pol. 1307'35) on ἀθρόα μεταβολή, not to Metaphysics Θ 6.156 Nowhere does he allude to the relation of present and perfect tenses. Nor does anyone in the debate recorded by Simplicius, which ranges widely through the merits and demerits of the Aristotelian category ποιήσεως καὶ πάθεως.

The best contribution comes from Iamblichus (ap. Simpl. In Cat. 303. 35–304. to Kalbfeisch). He attacks Plotinus’ assumption that ‘Change is incomplete actuality’ is a straightforward definition per genus et differentiam, the genus being ἐνέργεια and ἀτέλης the differentia. Instead, he says we should read ἀτέλης as an alienans qualification. Rather than placing κίνησις within the wider class of ἐνέργεια, it indicates that κίνησις barely counts as ἐνέργεια at all: ‘it falls away into some altogether inferior nature’ (303. 37–8 Kalbfeisch). But at least it has a nature of sorts. The definition allows Aristotle to insist that κίνησις is not the nothing, the not-being, to which some Platonists of the Academy would condemn it.157

This acute piece of commentary brings me back to Plotinus. If he says in 6. 1. 16. 6–7 that κίνησις is ἐνέργεια μὲν πάντως, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλαι καὶ πάλιν, he cannot be using ἐνέργεια in the sense defined in Metaphysics Θ 6, which is such that κίνησις is not ἐνέργεια at all. He casts κίνησις as a proper species of the genus ἐνέργεια, substituting ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλαι καὶ πάλιν158 for what he took to be Aristotle’s differentia ἀτέλης. Accordingly, when he

156 Likewise, J. C. De Groot’s very interesting article ‘Philoponus on De anima II 5, Physics III 3, and the Propagation of Light’, Phronesis, 28 (1983), 177–96, fails to show that Philoponus knows the Passage as well as the ἀθρόα μεταβολή passages in Aristotle’s Physics. Cf. n. 45 above on the striking absence of the Passage from Philoponus, De aeternitate mundi.

157 Here again, as at the very beginning of this project, I refer readers to Frede, ‘Potentiality’.

158 Whatever that means: neither Bre Bir’s ‘un acte qui recommence de nouveau à chaque instant’ (E. Bre Bir (ed.), Plotin: Ennéades (6 vols.; Paris, 1924–81), nor Armstrong’s ‘has also the “over and over again”’, nor Linguist’s ‘si presenta come un di nuovo e poi di nuovo’ (p. 73 n. 200) is helpful. M. P. Wagner, ‘Philoponus on the Nature of Physical Reality’, in L. P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge, 1996), 130–70 at 140, is just baffling: ‘embraces its completeness recursively’. MacKenna, as usual, strives for a definite meaning: ‘It entails repetition (lacks finality). It repeats, not in order that it may achieve actuality—it is that already—but that it may attain a goal distinct from itself and posterior’ (S. MacKenna, Plotinus: The Enneads, Translated, 2nd edn. (London, 1956)). A better guide, perhaps, is Enn. 3. 7 [45]. 8. 37–41, where the πάλαι καὶ πάλιν of κίνησις is likened to the πάλιν καὶ παλίνων of water flowing πάλιν καὶ πάλιν and the distance it is observed to cover. This rather suggests that the phrase πάλαι καὶ πάλιν simply refers to κίνησις being something that is essentially extended through time, as opposed to a thing which is complete καὶ τὸ νόμον. In other words, πάλαι καὶ πάλιν convey the idea of going on and on. Cf. πάλιν ἰδρεύξις in the discussion of time itself at 3. 7 [45]. 11. 36–7 and the contrast with eternity at 3. 15 ff. Why can’t Plotinus translators give us something that makes sense?
proceeds to say that κίνησις is already ἐνέργεια, he cannot mean ἐνέργεια in the sense of Metaphysics Θ 6. In general, no one who predicates ἐνέργεια of κίνησις or κίνησις of ἐνέργεια is following the exclusive distinction we find, uniquely, in the Passage.

Now to pull back the curtain. Simpl. In Cat. 307. 1–6 Kalbbleisch cites ἐνέργεια μὲν πάντως, ἔχει δὲ καὶ τὸ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν, plus the words that follow down to the end of Plotinus' sentence at 16. 8, as a quotation from Iamblichus recording a Stoic objection to Aristotle's account of κίνησις as ἐνέργεια ἄτελης. Everything I have found in Plotinus so far is borrowed from Stoics. This shows some Stoics—whether of Hellenistic or Imperial vintage we need not decide—responding to Aristotle's Physics. It does not and cannot show them aware of the Passage,159 which eliminates the very possibility of ἐνέργεια ἄτελης.160

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Barnes, J: see Ross and Barnes.


159 Pace Frede, 'Tenses', 146. The Stoic origin of Plotinus' words is not signalled by Armstrong, although Kalbbleisch as editor of Simplicius is scrupulously detailed in his source citation.

160 In preparing this Appendix I have been helped by the knowledgeable advice of Riccardo Chiaradonna, Paul Kalligas, and Lucas Siorvanes. It is more important than usual to add that they are not responsible for my conclusions.

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PLATE 1. Distribution of the Passage in the Stemma Codicum. Red circles mark the presence of the Passage, blue squares the omission of Θ

Plate 2. Line of deletion on fo. 361r of A²= Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, MS Plut. 87.12
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