present in the whole in the way that matter is present in form. Johansen suggests that the relationship of the parts to the whole is one in which the parts are definitionally prior to the whole; if the whole were definitionally prior, then capacities for nutrition and perception would depend upon the kind of soul to which they belong.

Nonetheless, it is unclear how one might explain the unity of the whole soul without appealing to the priority of the whole over its parts: if not the whole soul, there is no clear source of unity for the particular, individual powers of the soul. Aristotle offers a hint in *Metaphysics* Z.10, but, without further elaboration, it remains uncertain that the soul is a unified being and not a mere aggregate of parts with independent powers and functions. Indeed, this is not a worry for Johansen’s interpretation so much as it is a general worry for Aristotle’s account of the soul; although Johansen makes good sense of the tension between modularity and holism, particularly in the final chapter of the book, he is not entirely able to save Aristotle from a pressing dilemma: either the soul is an aggregate of different fundamental capacities, or the parts of the soul depend upon the single, unified soul.

The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul is certain to be a valuable contribution to the existing literature on Aristotle’s *De Anima*. Its novelty lies in its overall approach to *De Anima*, as it seeks to situate the work within Aristotle’s natural philosophy while offering an interpretation of the relationship between the various capacities of Aristotle’s soul. While the work functions splendidly as a whole, a number of its individual chapters are able to stand alone as valuable discussions of the particular capacities central to *De Anima*. The work will be most valuable to scholars and advanced students of Aristotle with an interest in Aristotle’s scientific methodology and psychology; it will also be useful for historians and contemporary philosophers with an interest in the history of faculty psychology and the Aristotelian accounts of perception and nutrition.

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After years of neglect, Alexander of Aphrodisias is making a comeback, with scholars increasingly recognizing his value as an interpreter of Aristotle and as a philosopher in his own right. This excellent volume should encourage further study of Alexander. Its contents will be of particular interest to scholars interested in prime matter or in naturalist interpretations of the soul.

While not a commentary on Aristotle’s *De Anima*, Alexander’s own *On the Soul* pursues the same topic with a similar method and structure. Alexander develops and systematizes many of Aristotle’s fundamental notions with a number of important results. Of particular interest is Alexander’s naturalistic understanding of the soul, on which the soul is a “power and form and completion of the body that has it, as it comes into being from a certain mixture and blend of the primary bodies” (24.3–4). In his interpretative notes, Victor Caston convincingly argues that Alexander thinks the soul supervenes on the bodies that give rise to it (n. 40, 90, 92). Thus soul, for Alexander, is always existentially dependent on body and cannot exist without it.

Alexander’s approach deserves careful attention as he avoids some of the problems of contemporary functionalist interpretations of Aristotle, for example, claiming that Aristotle treats the soul as an attribute of the body, like health, and not as a substance, so that ascribing activities to the soul is a straightforward category mistake. As Christopher Shields has argued, it is Aristotle’s carefully worked out account of the unity of form and matter, not an appeal to category mistakes, that leads him to claim that he can account for the unity of body and soul (“The Priority of Soul in Aristotle’s *De Anima*: Mistaking Categories?” in
Dorothea Frede and Burkhard Reis, editors, *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 2009). Alexander avoids this functionalist mistake by clearly respecting the soul’s status as form while arguing that forms cannot be the proper subject of activities or changes.

Alexander’s discussion of soul emergence is just one of the important views he explicates and defends, including a careful presentation of the case for prime matter, a detailed account of perceptual error, and a subtle and intricate exploration of the relationships between the visible, color, light, and the transparent.

Caston’s introduction gives a clear exposition of the structure and contours of the text and explains the philosophical importance and exegetical novelty of some of Alexander’s claims. Caston helpfully introduces numbered premises to the text to elucidate the structure of Alexander’s arguments. His interpretative notes are consistently relevant and useful, providing welcome elaborations and expansions of Alexander’s often very compressed arguments. He also does an excellent job of identifying Alexander’s interlocutors, including Stoics and Platonists as well as fellow Aristotelians. Caston often shares his judgments concerning how successful Alexander’s arguments ultimately prove, both in the relevant dialectical context and as stand-alone pieces of reasoning. I found these judgments to be useful, even when I disagreed. They serve as a model of how to engage with the philosophical views of an ancient commentator, finding a middle path between the extremes of thoughtless condescension and unwavering deference.

Caston’s translation renders Alexander’s Greek into relatively straightforward English prose, avoiding jargon. Compare Athanaios Fotinis’s translation of 28.12–26: “Among [soul’s] powers, some are primitive and thus of less perfection; these are followed by a second order of powers, and there are still other powers that transcend [sic] these latter. But in all these relationships, one principle is constant: lower powers can be separated from those that follow, but higher powers cannot exist apart from their inferiors.” Now Caston: “For among the powers of the soul, some are first and simpler, and so because of this are also less advanced, while others come after them, and still others yet again above them, so that all of them are related to each other in such a way that the earlier powers can be separated from the subsequent ones, but the subsequent ones cannot occur without the earlier ones.”

Caston’s rendering is more readable, more faithful, and makes Alexander’s inferences easier to follow. Although there were a few translation choices that I found somewhat questionable (such as translating ‘phantasia’ as ‘representation,’ building in Caston’s own interpretation of the role of this power, and the redundant ‘origin and principle’ for *archê*), these are only minor complaints. Caston also explains and defends all of his departures from standard terminology.

In summary, this edition of one of the most important discussions of the soul from late antiquity offers an excellent translation, a clear introduction, and notes providing detailed interpretations and cross-references. The volume upholds the high standards of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle project and should be of interest to all ancient and medieval scholars working on philosophy of mind.

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Byers’s book focuses on the Stoic background to Augustine’s account of moral motivation and moral progress, though many other background sources and topics are discussed as well. She covers relevant passages from the classical Augustinian works most familiar to