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V. Caston (trans.) *Alexander of Aphrodisias: On the Soul. Part I: Soul as Form of the Body, Parts of the Soul, Nourishment, and Perception.* Pp. viii + 248. London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012. Cased, £70. ISBN: 978-1-78093-024-4.

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The Classical Review / Volume 63 / Issue 02 / October 2013, pp 400 - 402
DOI: 10.1017/S0009840X13000425, Published online: 12 September 2013

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0009840X13000425

How to cite this article:

Gweltaz Guyomarc'h (2013). The Classical Review, 63, pp 400-402 doi:10.1017/S0009840X13000425

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For those unfamiliar with ancient lexicography, V.'s volume may pose certain challenges, as he does not give information about the date and textual state of several of the sources he mentions. A more accessible overview of the types of lexicographical activity current in antiquity is provided by J. Barnes's introduction to Bonelli's text and commentary. None the less, V.'s edition is an indispensable tool for those interested not only in ancient lexicography but also the study of Plato and Platonic traditions.

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ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS

CASTON (V.) (trans.) *Alexander of Aphrodisias: On the Soul. Part I: Soul as Form of the Body, Parts of the Soul, Nourishment, and Perception*. Pp. viii + 248. London: Bristol Classical Press, 2012. Cased, £70. ISBN: 978-1-78093-024-4.

doi:10.1017/S0009840X13000425

This volume is part of the famous *Ancient Commentators on Aristotle* series, under the general editorship of R. Sorabji who has recently announced the publication of the 100th volume. With this 91st volume, C. fills an important gap in the series: Alexander of Aphrodisias' *De anima* which was hitherto available to English readers only in an incomplete translation by A.P. Fotinis (1979). Not only does this publication fill a gap, but it also constitutes in itself a major contribution to the series as well as to studies on Alexander.

In accordance with the standard practice of this series, the volume contains an introduction and an English translation. It is completed by a commentary, a bibliography, an English–Greek glossary, a Greek–English index, which lists occurrences for both Parts 1 and 2, an index of passages cited and a subject index.

Alexander's treatise is not a commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*: Alexander certainly wrote a proper commentary that is only known through secondary accounts. But it is not an independent or, as it is sometimes called, a 'personal' work. As C. rightly points out, Alexander follows, develops or reinterprets Aristotle's argumentation. Alexander deals with the soul in general (form and matter), the vegetative soul and the sensitive soul. When writing his own treatise, he obviously bears in mind Aristotle's *De anima*. Of course, Alexander's treatise presents discrepancies with the organisation of Aristotle's *De anima*, which can probably be explained in reference to its controversial purpose. Furthermore, his interpretation of Aristotle's text is more implicit and far less formal than in a lemmatic commentary. None the less, one can hardly agree with C. when he writes that 'a commentary seeks to elucidate a text; a treatise seeks to defend the truth' (p. 2). The difference in Alexander's corpus between commentaries and treatises probably lies foremost in a difference between the audiences for whom each type of work is intended – for advanced students on one side and for a wider but educated public including philosophers from rival schools on the other. For Alexander, as he makes clear at the beginning of the treatise, Aristotle's philosophy is the truth (*De anima* 2.4–9; see also *De mixtione* 227.1–2 and *De providentia* 32 Ruland). So defending the truth and explaining Aristotle are one and the same.

C.'s introduction (pp. 1–22) deftly sets out the main points for the first half of Alexander's *De anima*. After a brief presentation of Alexander's life and works, a summary of the 'Organisation and aims of the treatise', the introduction is divided into

eight parts following the course of the treatise and studies its principal themes: naturalism; form and matter; supervenience and emergentism; parts of the soul; perceiving; nourishing and reproducing oneself; perceptibles and error; seeing, light and colours. Understanding of Alexander's psychology has long been divided between materialism and mysticism: the first reading that comes from the Middle Ages is based on the beginning of the treatise which describes the soul as emerging from a bodily mixture and the second interpretation on some statements in the passages on the intellect. C. rightly rejects the materialist interpretation and, as in a previous article ('Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern', *Philosophical Review* 106 [1997], 309–63), he reads Alexander's psychology as holding an epiphenomenalism. Without doubt, this question and C.'s interpretation constitute the key points of the volume. Alexander describes how the soul appears 'above' an underlying mixture (*epigignesthai*, see e.g. *De anima* 24.23–8; 25.2–3). The particular mixture that constitutes the body is somehow its 'principle' (*arkhê*), thus 'it is not possible to conceive of any activity of soul apart from a bodily change' (12.21–2). But it does not follow from this that the soul can be *reduced* to a bodily state. As C. strongly emphasises, the Exegete himself 'straightforwardly rejects reduction' (p. 11; see also n. 40) and clear signs of this idea can be read in several passages (e.g. 24.18–23; 25.3–9). The soul is not only a reality of higher-level but also a causal power to perform defined activities which should not be identified with the particular harmony of the underlying blend. Therefore, Alexander's description of the emergence of the soul from a bodily mixture, which is the origin of the materialist interpretation, is not at odds with the ontological priority of form and the 'essentialist' position (which M. Rashed attributed to Alexander's ontology in *Essentialisme. Alexandre d'Aphrodise entre logique, physique et cosmologie* [2007]). C. reaches the nub of the matter and does full justice to Alexander's subtlety by convincingly noting that the 'bottom-up account' of the emergence of the soul does not clash with the 'top-down approach' of the priority of form as the very heart of substantiality (n. 90).

The translation is based on the text established by I. Bruns (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Supplementum Aristotelicum* 2.1) and contains about 50 emendations of Bruns's text. It is not the first translation into a modern language: C. admits to have greatly benefited from the excellent Italian translation by P. Accattino and P. Donini and the French translation by R. Dufour and M. Bergeron. C.'s translation is, as far as a French reviewer can judge, remarkably clear and thorough and faces with courage the difficulty of Alexander's Greek: Alexander, says C., gives the same impression as if he were writing 'in academic German' (p. 23). Moreover, C. works hard to keep the reader on track through long arguments, breaking the sentences into shorter premises and numbering them according to the progression of the reasoning. The translation pays careful attention to philosophical terminology. The rendering of '*teleiôtês*' by 'culmination', for example, accurately captures the ontological meaning of this key word in Alexander's metaphysics, which indicates the actualisation of a form (though, as C. points out, it understates its ethical connotation, see n. 64). Concerning this word, one could argue there is one small inaccuracy in the 'Note' introducing the translation (p. 24): 'culmination' renders '*teleiôtês*' and not '*teleiôsis*', elsewhere translated by 'development' (*teleiôsis* occurs only in 36.6; see Greek–English index, p. 213).

One could regret the publication in two separate volumes of one single treatise, especially in a division that does not fit with the logical structure of the treatise. But this book is much more than a translation. C. executes an admirable work in providing notes on each passage of Alexander's text and this continuous commentary covers more than a third of the volume. The notes indicate textual or interpretative problems and related texts by Plato, Aristotle, Alexander, other post-Hellenistic philosophers and even

Descartes. C. also delves into the logical structure of Alexander's arguments (e.g. n. 237). The references to related texts are often, if not always, far more complete and more systematic than those of the Italian and French editions: for example concerning the prime matter (n. 26) or the light (nn. 375–6).

C. offers a valuable work that cannot but be praised. For those, especially students, who know little about the Exegete par excellence, this translation provides an ideal introduction. Specialists will find enlightening and inspiring suggestions to understand better Alexander's psychology. Given the quality of this volume, and as C. is one of the most eminent scholars on Aristotle's theory of intellect, the publication of the second part is even more eagerly awaited.

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A NEW LIGHT ON PHILOSTRATUS' *HEROICUS*

HODKINSON (O.) *Authority and Tradition in Philostratus' Heroikos*. (Satura 8.) Pp. 147. Lecce: Pensa, 2011. Paper, €18. ISBN: 978-88-8232-866-5.

doi:10.1017/S0009840X13000437

This book, based on H.'s MA dissertation submitted to the University of Exeter in 2003, has been revised and published with 'the addition of some material in chapter 3' (p. 8) and an updated bibliography. H. divides his text into an introduction plus three chapters, in which issues such as genre, programmatic aspects, intertextuality, knowledge and authority are discussed.

Heroicus, written by Philostratus in the third century A.D., is set as a dialogue in the Thracian Chersonese (which is located almost exactly on the shore opposite to Troy) between a local Vinedresser and a visiting Phoenician. The Vinedresser cultivates and lives in close contact with a hero from the Homeric past, Protesilaus. Protesilaus has another version of the Trojan War and accuses Homer of having been fooled by Odysseus. He retells the story, accusing Odysseus of murdering Palamedes, who is, in his version, the true hero. The dialogue begins with the Phoenician doubting what he is being told, and ends with his complete 'conversion'.

Before I comment on H.'s work, it is relevant to position the *Heroicus* among recent scholarship on Philostratus. As noted by H., there are some recent studies on Philostratus such as J. Elsner and E. Bowie, *Philostratus* (2009 and see *CR* 60 [2010], 397–400) and K. Demoen and D. Praet, *Theios Sophistes. Essays on Flavius Philostratus' Vita Apollonii* (2004 and see *CR* 60 [2010], 77–9). E.B. Aitken and J.K.B. Maclean's *Philostratus' Heroikos. Religion and Cultural Identity in the Third Century C.E.* (2004 and see *JHS* 126 [2006], 165) marks a change in attitude towards this neglected and underestimated work. However, the *Heroicus* has received much less attention than other works in the Philostratan corpus, which H. attributes to the fictional character of the text and a lack of good translations.

The introduction synthesizes the arguments that will be developed in the book, exhibiting recurrent themes of the *Heroicus*. According to H. there are three issues addressed by Philostratus in this text: (a) a revision of Homer's account of the Trojan War in the *Iliad*;

¹English edited by Estelliane Kermagoret.